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Utgangsspørsmålet for dette verket er om prøvingsretten har et demokratisk problem. Jeg tar 
utgangspunkt i det norske systemet for prøvingsrett, og viser hvordan denne debatten leder til 
grunnleggende spørsmål om demokrati og konstitusjonalisme. Spenningen mellom demokrati 
og konstitusjonalisme kan ses som en spenning mellom konkurrerende legitimitetsprinsipper 
for utøvelse av makt. Hvor langt skal folket selv inkluderes i egen styring, og hvem setter 
betingelsene for den styringen? Dette, helt grunnleggende er spørsmålene prøvingsretten 
bringer opp. Jeg presenterer først et overblikk på prøvingsretten, og ser på systemene som 
finnes i Norge, USA, Canada og Storbritannia. Jeg tar også opp noen teoretiske distinksjoner 
rundt debatten om prøvingsrett. Et hovedskille går mellom sterk (Norge og USA) og svak 
(Canada og Storbritannia) prøvingsrett. Jeg diskuterer prøvingsretten og hva det betyr å stille 
spørsmål ved dette systemets demokratiske legitimitet. Jeg tar for meg tre teorier om 
demokrati fra Ronald Dworkin, og Jeremy Waldron, Allan C. Hutchinson og Jose Colón-
Ríos. Jeg argumenterer for at Dworkin og Waldron begge er sårbare for innvendinger som 
vektlegger idéen om demokrati som selvstyre. Mens Hutchinson og Colón-Ríos, som mener 
at borgeres reelle deltagelse er essensielt for demokratisk legitimitet, representerer en idé om 
demokrati som er mer radikal enn både Dworkin og Waldron. Den siste delen bruker jeg på å 
utvikle spenningen mellom demokrati og konstitusjonalisme, og på hva det faktisk kan bety å 
åpne opp for større muligheter for borgeres politiske deltagelse på grunnlovsnivå. 
 
I begin this work by asking if judicial review is democratic. I begin with the Norwegian 
system of judicial review, and show how this debate lead to foundational questions about 
democracy and judicial review. The tension between democracy and constitutionalism can be 
viewed as a tension between competing principles of legitimacy. To what degree should 
citizens be included in their own governance, and who makes the conditions for that 
governance? I first present an overview of judicial review, and use the systems in Norway, 
USA, Canada and The United Kingdom. I also deal with some theoretical distinctions in the 
debate about judicial review. A main division is between strong (Norway, USA) and weak 
(Canada, United Kingdom) judicial review. I discuss judicial review and what it means to 
question the democratic legitimacy of this system. I examine three different conceptions of 
democracy, due to Ronald Dworkin, Jeremy Waldron, Allan C. Hutchinson and Jose Colón-
Ríos. I argue that both Dworkin and Waldron are both vulnerable to objections that are based 
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on the idea of democracy as self-government. The last part deals with exploring the tension 
between democracy and constitutionalism, and what it might actually mean to increase 
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Chapter 1:  Judicial Review. 
 
 
For myself it would be most irksome to be ruled by bevy of Platonic Guardians, even if I knew how to 
choose them, which I assuredly do not. If they were in charge, I should miss the stimulus of living in a 
society where I have, at least theoretically, some part in the direction of public affairs. Of course I 
know how illusory would be the belief that my vote determined anything; but nevertheless when I go to 
the polls I have a satisfaction in the sense that we are all engaged in a common venture.1 
 
This thesis is about the democratic legitimacy of judicial review. I begin with an introductory 
chapter. Here I present judicial review and its main characteristics, and also present the 
systems of judicial review found in Norway, the United States, Canada, and the United 
Kingdom. I argue that questions about the democratic legitimacy of judicial review raises 
questions about constitutionalism and democracy as well. 
 
1.1 Judicial Review: The Shipping tax case. 
In 2010, the Norwegian Supreme Court ruled a new system of tonnage tax legislation for 
owners of shipping companies unconstitutional. The system was enacted by the Norwegian 
parliament in 2007. Under the old system from 1996 shipping owners paid a set tax on the 
tonnage of their ships each year as opposed to paying on turnover. Under this system 
shipping companies were able to defer paying taxes on profits provided they did not pay out 
dividends. When the new system was implemented the government demanded that the 
companies pay the deferred tax from the last 10 years, a sum of approximately 21 billion 
NOK. Some shipping companies objected to this, claiming that this legislation violated the 
Norwegian constitution. Specifically, they argued that §97, which bans retroactive legislation 
(ex post facto laws)2, contradicted the legislature’s demand that they pay in order to be 
included in the new tax system. After several rounds in the court system, the case was put to 
the Norwegian Supreme court in 2010, which found that the legislation was indeed 
unconstitutional. The result was that the owners did not have to pay the 21 billion NOK in 
                                                 
1 Judge Learned Hand cited in Zurn, “Deliberative Democracy and Constitutional Review”, (2002): 467. 
2 Meaning that laws cannot retroactively change the legal consequences or status of actions that were committed 
before the law was enacted. In the case of criminal law this means that no one can be prosecuted for actions that 
were legal when it was committed, but was later made illegal. In the case of the shipping owners they argued 
that having to pay taxes retroactively violated this ban. 
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taxes they would have otherwise owed.3 It was a close decision by the Norwegian Supreme 
Court, 6 justices believed it to be unconstitutional while 5 did not. 
 
The 2007 tax law had been extensively debated in the Norwegian legislature (Stortinget). The 
Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of Finance had also given legal opinions about the law. 
The minority in the case noted that the evaluation of the constitutionality of the 2007 tax 
legislation was likely the most extensive done by a parliamentary committee on the 
constitutionality of a piece of legislation. This did not, however, persuade the majority.4 
Sturla Henriksen, director of the Norwegian shipping owner’s association (Norsk 
Rederiforbund) said after the decision that: “Høyesterett har I dag bekreftet grunnlovens 
beskyttelse mot å gi lover med tilbakevirkende kraft. Det er en prinsipiell avgjørelse av stor 
betydning for rettsikkerheten til oss alle”. In this way he emphasized the role of the supreme 
court as a protection from state overreach. 
 
The shipping tax case is an example of Judicial Review. It gives the judiciary the authority to 
invalidate legislation that it rules to be in violation with the constitution. While judicial 
review has had long standing as constitutional custom in Norway it was officially included in 
the constitution after a substantial revision in 2014. §87 of the Norwegian constitution now 
states that: “I saker som reises for domstolene, har domstolene rett og plikt til å prøve om 
lover og andre beslutninger truffet av statens myndigheter strider mot Grunnloven”.5 
 
This highlight the fact that in systems of judicial review like those found in Norway and the 
U.S., it is a supreme court that has the final say in important political decisions about rights, 
and the interpretation of the constitution. This is, prima facie, opposed to the democratic ideal 
of self-government, in which political decisions ought to be made by the people themselves 
or their elected representatives. The counter-majoritarian difficulty points out that this 
institution runs counter to a central value and principle in contemporary democracies, namely 
popular self-government. Defences of judicial review have therefore often addressed the issue 
of judicial review by examining how we ought to understand democracy. 
                                                 
3 Kierulf, “Taking Judicial Review Seriously” (2014), 237-238, Kronen, “Plenumsdom i Høyesterett – 
skattlegging av rederier I strid med Grunnloven §97” (2010), accessed October 9, 2017, 
https://lovdata.no/artikkel/plenumsdom_i_hoyesterett_ 
_skattlegging_av_rederier_i_strid_med_grunnloven_%C2%A7_97/335, Svalastog and Sættem, “Rederne 
slipper milliardskatt” (2010),accessed October 9, 2017: www.nrk.no/okonomi/rederne-slipper-milliardskatt-
1.6990356, Berge, “Rederne vant i Høyesterett”, (2009), accessed October 9, 2017, 
www.nettavisen.no/na24/2829603.html. 
4 Kierulf, Taking Judicial Review Seriously (2014), 238-239. 




1.2. What is Judicial Review? 
 
Judicial review is a practice whereby courts are sometimes called upon to review a law or some other 
official act of government (e.g. the decision of an administrative agency such as a state or provincial 
labour relations board) to determine its constitutionality, or perhaps its reasonableness, rationality or its 
compatibility of fundamental principles of justice.6 
 
There are many different systems of judicial review. But they are generally divided between a 
European and a U.S. model of judicial review. In addition, there is another distinction 
between strong and weak judicial review. 
 
The distinction between U.S. and European model of judicial review divides among three 
main lines. In the U.S. model review takes place after legislation has taken force (ex ante), it 
is done in concrete cases, and these cases are brought before courts of general jurisdiction. 
Meaning that while there is a Supreme Court that decides on constitutional matters, the U.S. 
model does not have a separate constitutional court. In the European model, by contrast, 
review is often undertaken before a piece of legislation has taken force, i.e. before any 
particular case can arise, and it is undertaken by a constitutional court separate from the 
ordinary courts.7 In addition, on the European model, legislatures have the positive power to 
decide laws, while a judiciary has the negative power to reject or nullify them. On this model 
rights ought to be excluded from being a subject of review. That is, what rights individual 
have should not be a matter the judiciary could decide upon. Neither should constitutions 
have lofty formulations about human rights.8 In the words of the Austrian legal scholar Hans 
Kelsen: 
 
Sometimes constitutions themselves may refer to principles, which invoke the ideals of equity, justice, 
liberty, equality, morality, etc., without in the least defining what is meant by these terms […] But with 
respect to constitutional justice, these principles can play an extremely dangerous role. A court could 
interpret these constitutional provisions, which invite the legislator to honor the principles of justice, 
equity, equality […] as positive requirements for the [material] content of laws.9 
 
                                                 
6 Waluchow, “Judicial Review” (2007), 258. 
7 Kierulf, Taking Judicial Review Seriously (2014), 95. 
8 Ibid., 96. 
9 Kelsen cited in Ibid., 97. 
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Many constitutions in European countries have not followed this last element, their 
constitutions also have a bill of rights. Nonetheless, this aspect of the European model 
expresses a desire to limit the role of the judiciary as a de facto creator of laws. 10 
 
A connected distinction, and the one that I will be primarily be concerned, is between strong 
and weak judicial review. This is identical to the distinction between the U.S. and European 
model, but the U.S. model has more in common with strong judicial review, while the 
European model will more easily map onto weak judicial review. 
 
In a system of strong judicial review, the courts have the authority to not apply a piece of 
legislation in a particular case, or to modify the legislation so as to conform with the 
constitution. In addition, a system of strong judicial review gives courts the authority to rule 
in such a way that the legislation, while formally still in effect, is no longer enforced or have 
normative force (dead letter).11 
In a system of weak judicial review, on the other hand, courts may evaluate a piece of 
legislation for its conformity with a constitution, but does not allow the courts the authority to 
render the legislation unenforceable, even when the court rules the legislation to be in 
contradiction with the constitution. A stronger, but still weak, system of judicial review may 
allow courts the authority to render legislation unenforceable, but also grants legislatures the 
authority to override the courts decision.12 
 
Weak judicial review is also typically undertaken by a separate constitutional court, while 
strong review is done by the ordinary judiciary. Supreme court cases of review generally start 
in lower courts and can end up in the supreme court through a series of appeals. This was the 
case for the Tax legislation case in the Norwegian judiciary. 
 
1.3. The case of Norway. 
The Norwegian constitution dates back to 1814. After the U.S., Norway has the second oldest 
constitution in the world that is still in effect.13 The Norwegian constitution can only be 
amended by the legislature. Amendments have to be put forth by one legislature and voted on 
by the next after an election. The vote requires a 2/3 supermajority. The Norwegian Supreme 
                                                 
10 Ibid., 97. 
11 Waldron, “The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review” (2006), 1354. 
12 Ibid, 1346, Kierulf, Taking Judicial Review Seriously, 97 and Tushnet, “Alternative Forms of Judicial 
Review” (2006), 2786. 
13 Smith, Høyesterett og Folkestyret (1993), foreword. 
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Court consists of 20 justices, the head of the Supreme Court has the title of Chief Justice. 
They are appointed by the government. Ordinarily, cases are heard by five of the justices, but 
some cases are heard in Grand Chamber by eleven justices or by all 20 justices. Cases of 
judicial review are always heard in either Grand Chamber or by all justices in cases of 
particular importance. Justices also sit in the Appeals selection committee which decides 
what appeals ought to be heard in the supreme court.14 There is no separate constitutional 
court in the Norwegian legal system. Review cases take place after legislation has taken 
effect and are put before the court in concrete cases. 
 
The practice of judicial review has a long history in Norway, though it was not officially a 
part of the constitution until 2014. The earliest known case in which the Norwegian Supreme 
Court discuss its authority and competence to review legislation is from 1866.15 In a case 
between naval officer Captain Lieutenant Wedel-Jarlsberg and the state, Chief Justice Peder 
Carl Lasson said of the issue of judicial review: 
 
What has the Supreme Court to do, when presented at the same time with the constitution and a private 
statute? It has then, as far as I know constitutional law, been generally agreed that as one cannot place 
it upon the courts to uphold both these laws at once, they must necessarily give preference to the 
Constitution […]16 
 
Meaning, of course, that in cases before the court where ordinary laws passed by the 
legislature conflicted with constitutional law, the latter takes precedence. 
 
The Norwegian system of judicial review strongly resembles the U.S. model. In practice, 
however, the Norwegian practice of judicial review has been less politically controversial 
than in the U.S.17 Norway is the second oldest system of judicial review. But despite its long 
history in Norway, the practice of judicial review has not been uncontroversial. In the 1960s 
historian Jens Arup Seip famously described judicial review as a reaction to the growth of 
parliamentarism towards the end of the 19th century. 
 
Et studium vil vise at prøvingsretten ble laget for å anvendes I det politiske spill. I sin tilblivelse og i 
sine første virkninger var den politisk reaksjonær og klart antiparlamentarisk av karakter. Den var en 
                                                 
14 “Høyesterett”, domstol.no, last modified august 14, 2017, http://www.domstol.no/no/Om-domstolene/De-
alminnelige-domstolene/Hoyesterett/, and Kierulf, Taking Judicial Review Seriously (2014), 153. 
15 Deliberations from the Norwegian Supreme Court was not made public until 1863, Kierulf, Taking Judicial 
Review Seriously (2014), 171. 
16 Chief Justice Lasson cited in Kierulf, Taking Judicial Review Seriously, (2014)172. 
17 Smith, Høyesterett og Folkestyret (1993), 32. 
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kjepp med vilje kastet inn i demokratiets hjul, en siste handling, bak stortingets rygg, av den 
detroniserte embetsstand.18 
 
While Seip’s interpretation of the of judicial review in Norway and its history as purely 
political, stemming from a reaction against the growth of parliamentarism is likely not 
correct, as judicial review arose as supreme court practice at an earlier stage, concerns about 
judicial review and its legitimacy as a part of the basic framework of a democratic society 
have remained.19 Both in concrete political debates in Norway and in the larger philosophical 
and political debate about judicial review. 
 
1.4. Strong Judicial Review; the United States. 
The United States is the example of strong judicial review. Both in institutional design and in 
judicial and political practice. The U.S. supreme court consists of eight Associate Justices and 
one Chief Justice. Justices are nominated by the President and require the consent of the 
Senate in order to be appointed. As is the case in Norway, the only way for the legislature to 
set aside Supreme Court decisions on the constitutionality of legislation is to amend the 
constitution. In the U.S. this requires a vote of two-thirds in each house of Congress20, and 
then ratified by three-fourths of the states (either by state legislatures or conventions within 
the states). Alternatively, a special national convention can be called, though this has never 
occurred.21 As is the case in Norway there is no separate constitutional court, and the 
supreme court deals with cases after they have already been put before lower courts and been 
appealed. 
 
The United States was the first nation to institute a system of judicial review. With the case of 
Marbury v. Madison in 1803, Chief Justice John Marshall established the authority of the 
Supreme Court to invalidate laws that conflicted with the constitution.22 The most significant 
feature of the decision in terms of judicial review was that the Supreme Court established its 
authority to review legislation in terms of its constitutionality.23 What the scope of this 
authority ought to be, and how it related to the constitutional interpretations of other branches 
of government were controversial issues for decades after. Over time, however, judicial 
review in the U.S. came to be a system in which a single institution had final say in the 
                                                 
18 Seip quoted in Ibid., 13. 
19 Ibid, 13, see also Slagstad, Rettens Ironi (2001). 
20 The U.S. legislature consists of two separate houses. The house of representatives and the Senate.   
21 Breyer, America’s Supreme Court (2011), 223. 
22 Ibid., 12. 




interpretation of the constitution. 24 And, furthermore, that legislation found to be 
unconstitutional by the supreme court will not be applied, it becomes a dead letter. 
 
1.5. Examples of Weak Judicial Review: Canada and the United Kingdom. 
As in the U.S. system Canadas Supreme Court consists one Chief justice, and eight other 
justices. They are appointed by the federal government as vacancies occur. Supreme Court 
Justices are eligible to serve until retirement at age 75. The Canadian system is also one 
where cases must first be heard in the lower courts and appealed up to the level of the 
supreme court. In addition, the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, enacted in 1982, 
also entrenches fundamental rights as higher law, it cannot be repealed by an ordinary 
legislative majority and the courts are empowered to undertake judicial review of 
legislation.25 But unlike both the systems of judicial review in Norway and the U.S. the 
Canadian Supreme Court does not have the final say in constitutional matters. The Supreme 
Court may rule a piece of legislation unconstitutional, and this will invalidate the legislation, 
but this is not the final say in the matter. The Canadian Charter includes section 33, which 
states that governments (federal and provincial) can invoke a “notwithstanding” clause. Such 
a “notwithstanding” clause enable legislatures in Canada to override a ruling from the 
supreme court about the constitutionality of legislation for a period of five years, subject to 
renewal.26 
 
One point of the notwithstanding clause was to give the Canadian Supreme Court a role in 
constitutional interpretation without making that Court’s judgements completely authoritative in the 
short run. A legislature that disagreed with the court’s interpretation could reenact the legislation found 
invalid, protecting against a subsequent challenge by invoking section 33.27 
 
According to Mark Tushnet, by including section 33, Canada invented weak-form judicial 
review.28 The possibility for legislatures to invoke a “notwithstanding” clause is a clear 
departure from the U.S. model of judicial review.29 The possibility for legislative override of 
the court’s constitutional interpretations with an ordinary majority is significant, even though 
in practice it is rarely used. 
 
                                                 
24 Tushnet, “Alternative Forms of Judicial Review” (2003), 2783. 
25 Gardbaum, “The New Commonwealth Model of Constitutionalism” (2001), 721, 723. 
26 Ibid., 722. 
27 Tushnet, “Alternative Forms of Judicial Review”, 2785. 
28 Ibid., 2785. 
29 Gardbaum, “The New Commonwealth Model of Constitutionalism”, 722. 
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For its part the U.K. has long been an example of a system of parliamentary or legislative 
supremacy, as opposed to the U.S. system of judicial supremacy. With the implementation of 
the Human Rights Act of 1998, this changed, but only to a certain extent.30 
The act incorporated the European Convention of Human Rights into British law. And the 
British Human Rights Act gives courts the authority to review and evaluate legislation in 
terms of its compatibility with the rights and freedoms in the European Convention of Human 
Rights as incorporated into British law. But the result of such a review is not that the law is 
struck down or rendered invalid, instead the court can issue a “declaration of 
incompatibility”. Section 4 (6) of the British Human rights acts states that such a declaration 
“[…] does not affect the validity, continuing operation or enforcement of the provision in 
respect of which it is given; and […] is not binding on the parties to the proceedings in which 
it is made”.31 Meaning that even though the court finds a piece of legislation to be in conflict 
with the Human Rights Act this does not affect the validity of the legislation. The U.K. 
system is a clearer example of weak judicial review, but the issue is by no means clear-cut.32 
 
1.6. Comparing Strong and Weak judicial review. 
The United States is the classical example of strong judicial review, and Canada a classical 
example of weak judicial review. Despite its classical status, however, Canada is quite similar 
to the U.S. system, and the clause that allows for legislative override has very rarely been 
used.33 The U.K. is a clearer example of weak judicial review, as legislation that the courts 
find to be in conflict with the European Convention of Human Rights, as incorporated into 
British law, continues to be in effect and be valid.34 
 
Norway is very similar to the U.S. model in terms of institutional design, and is an example 
of a system of strong judicial review. But it ought to be noted that the way judicial review has 
been practiced in Norway is quite different from what has been the case in the United States. 
Norwegian courts, including the supreme court, have for significant periods of time been 
quite deferential to other branches of government, particularly the legislature and their 
interpretation of the constitutionality of legislation.35 
                                                 
30 Ibid, 732. 
31 Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 42, § 4(2), (6), cited in Waldron Core of the Case Against Judicial Review 
(2006), 1355. 
32 See Gardbaum “The New Commonwealth Model of Constitutionalism” (2001) for more on the U.K system 
and its relationship to, among others, the Canadian system. 
33 This fact leads Jeremy Waldron to regard the Canadian system as strong judicial review, somewhat weakened 
by the possibility of legislatures invoking the “notwithstanding” clause. 
34 Ibid., 733. 




To be sure, differences between nation-states, in institutional design, the authority granted to 
different branches of government, as well as how systems of judicial review have actually 
been practised, are important in evaluating and comparing different systems of judicial 
review. And both the distinction between a European and a U.S. model of judicial review, as 
well as the distinction between strong and weak judicial review, are theoretical distinctions 
that to a lesser or greater extent will map on to actual implementations of judicial review. 
 
For now, I will take a step back from concrete examples and examine in more detail the 
reasons that systems of strong judicial review give rise to doubts about its democratic 
legitimacy. Arguments that focus on the democratic illegitimacy of judicial review are mainly 
targeted at systems of strong judicial review. The classical formulation of the problem is due 
to Alexander Bickel, and what he called the counter-majoritarian difficulty. 
 
1.7. The Counter-Majoritarian Difficulty with judicial review. 
In a system of strong judicial review, then, courts are empowered to overrule legislation or 
decisions made by the state on the grounds that they violate the constitution. And these 
decisions are the final word on the issue. This is not the case for weak judicial review where 
the courts may only review legislations or decisions. The reason for this has to do with the 
potential democratic worry with allowing a small set of judges overrule elected 
representatives of the people. If the review process does not allow the judiciary to have the 
authority to render inactive legislation which it rules to be unconstitutional, then potential 
worries concerned with the democratic legitimacy of judicial review are not so pressing. 
 
There is, prima facie, a tension in a system of judicial review in a democracy. If we assume 
that democracy is essentially rule by current majorities in a society, and that this majority rule 
is expressed in the decisions of the elected representatives of a people, then how can it be 
democratically legitimate to allow a small number of unelected judges to overrule the 
decisions of the representatives of the people? Zurn formulates the problem thusly: 
 
Since representative forms of democracy must involve the legislative enactment and executive 
enforcement of the will of the people, and since the will of the people is expressed in the majoritarian 
decisions of their elected representatives any governmental agency that overrules the outcomes of 
legislative practices appears not only undemocratic, but fundamentally anti-democratic.36 
                                                 




To be sure, there are issues concerning how a society’s elected representatives can be said to 
actually enforce ‘the will of the people’, whatever we take that to actually mean. But in 
principle at least, the justification for relegating decisions to elected representatives is 
squarely democratic in the sense that the representatives are electorally responsible. 
Something judges, for the most part, are not. Seip’s opinion about judicial review is an 
example of this line of reasoning. 
 
An influential way of replying to the counter-majoritarian worry has been to say that there 
ought to be limits on what a majority of voters or legislators can enact. What these limits are 
taken to be varies depending on who is attempting to impose them. But most often this is 
framed in a language of rights. That is, the argument is concerned with what individual rights 
should be protected in a society. The assumption is that individuals have certain rights that no 
majority can be justified in violating. For instance, we would tend to say that it is not 
legitimate for democracies to limit access to voting for certain minorities, regardless of what 
the majority in that society might believe. Seen in this light a system of judicial review 
becomes a matter of securing some basic individual rights, and hence individual citizens, 
from unjust state action. Proceeding from this premise, it is possible that rather than being a 
bug in the system, judicial review is in fact a feature. That is, the limits placed upon 
majoritarian decisions by a system of judicial review is not a democratic problem, rather it is 
part of a larger system that helps preserve democratic legitimacy. Or, at least, make sure that 
minorities can participate in political decisions and processes on the same terms as the 
majority. While there will be disagreement concerning what exactly the limits of majoritarian 
decisions ought to be, that there are such limits, on this view, is a good thing, and judicial 
review is a good way of defining those limits and upholding them. 
 
Another but related defence of judicial review is to point to the constitution that judicial 
review is there to protect as the true will of the people. While ordinary electoral politics is 
relegated to political representatives who are accountable to their voters at regular intervals, 
the constitution provides the basic framework and rights that ‘the people’ enacted as its most 
basic principles. On this view, when the judiciary overrules a legislature, it is in fact 
upholding the most basic political convictions of the demos. 
 
So, while the counter-majoritarian difficulty is certainly a challenge to defenders of judicial 
review it is by no means a settled issue. It is important to note that the counter-majoritarian 
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difficulty itself relies on an assumption about how democracy ought to be understood. It 
expresses a normative ideal for democratic legitimacy, namely that policy decisions made by 
a government ought to have the support of a majority of voters.  This view of democracy 
holds that “[…] at its core, democracy denotes a certain type of political process: majoritarian 
self-legislation as expressed through electorally accountable representative bodies”.37 
 
Which means it may be possible to avoid the counter-majoritarian difficulty by providing a 
different conception of democracy. In addition to the counter-majoritarian difficulty, there is 
related, but different concern about judicial review. Namely that it entails rule by a judicial 
elite. 
 
1.8. The Charge of judicial paternalism. 
The counter-majoritarian difficulty is a general worry about the legitimacy of judicial 
authority overriding legislative authority in political matters. Underlying it is a specific ideal 
of democracy as majority rule. Christopher F. Zurn highlights another, connected, but 
different, aspect of scepticism towards a system of strong judicial review. What he calls the 
charge of judicial paternalism. While the counter-majoritarian difficulty relies on a 
majoritarian view of democratic legitimacy the notion underlying the charge of paternalism is 
a somewhat more abstract idea. Namely that democracy implies self-rule, autonomy and self-
government. Zurn presents the issue like this: 
 
The issue is not the impact of one’s vote on the outcome – in large collectivities like modern nation-
states individual’s electoral impact may well be miniscule – but, rather, the degree to which the 
decision-making processes accord individuals the capacity to understand themselves as collective 
authors of the law that each is subject to.38 
 
The charge of judicial paternalism centres on the notion that leaving important constitutional 
matters in the hands of a small group of elite judges may weaken citizen’s political 
autonomy. 
 
Although Dworkin is a defender of judicial review, in Freedom’s Law he articulates a version 
of this scepticism. He defends what he calls the moral reading of the U.S. Constitution.39 He 
sees the constitution as expressing abstract moral principles, and the moral reading is a 
                                                 
37 Ibid, 471. 
38 Zurn, Deliberative Democracy and the Institutions of Judicial Review (2009), 5. 
39 Dworkin speaks specifically about the U.S. constitution, but I believe his points are valid for constitutionalism 
in general. Though there will be differences depending on the constitution in question. 
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strategy for interpreting the constitution. “Lawyers and judges, in their day-to-day work, 
instinctively treat the constitution as expressing abstract moral requirements that can only be 
applied to concrete cases through fresh moral judgements”.40 The moral reading is not the 
exclusive purview of a judicial elite however. “[It] proposes that we all – judges, lawyers, 
citizens – interpret and apply these abstract clauses on the understanding that they invoke 
moral principles about political decency and justice”.41 This means that in interpreting the 
constitution, everyone, judges included, must ultimately make use of their own judgement. 
The moral reading is, according to Dworkin, obvious and deeply embedded in constitutional 
review.42 And yet it is an interpretive strategy almost no constitutional expert, nor judge, will 
endorse. The reason for this is that to admit to the moral reading in contemporary U.S. legal 
and political debate would be to erase the distinction between law and morality, and simply 
leave law as the preferred morality of a given judge. According to Dworkin: 
 
It [the moral reading] seems grotesquely to constrict the moral sovereignty of the people themselves – 
to take out of their hands, and remit to a professional elite, exactly the great and defining issues of 
political morality that the people have the right and the responsibility to decide for themselves.43 
 
Dworkin’s further argument is that this worry about judges are not warranted. But it is not 
difficult to understand why many legal professionals, constitutional scholars and politicians 
would be reluctant to publicly endorse something like the moral reading. Whether or not the 
moral reading is the correct view of constitutional interpretation does also matter for the 
democratic legitimacy of judicial review. 
 
1.9. Constitutionalism, Democracy and Judicial Review. 
That the counter-majoritarian difficulty is also relevant for constitutionalism ought not really 
to be a surprise. After all, a system of judicial review is the enforcer of limits set forth in a 
constitution. And if the difficulty applies to the enforcer, it also applies to the rulebook, that 
is, the constitution. Put another way: if we accept that democracy means majority support of 
legislation, and that we because of this, find a system of judicial review to be in some way 
democratically suspect because it goes against a majority decision, then this suspicion will 
also extend to the constitution itself. Prima facie then, the counter-majoritarian difficulty is 
not simply a challenge to judicial review, it is a challenge to constitutionalism as such. After 
                                                 
40 Dworkin, Freedom’s Law (1997), 3. 
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all, why should a constitution enacted hundreds of years ago be used to overrule current 
majorities from enacting their will? 
 
So, from beginning with worries concerned with judicial review we are lead to deeper 
worries about constitutionalism. This is not to say the worries cannot be calmed. But rather 
that what is needed for both defenders and opponents of judicial review is a more full-fledged 
theory of constitutional democracy. Such theories will necessarily be normative rather than 
descriptive. While they certainly cannot ignore the structure of the countries we call 
democratic, their raison d’etre is to develop a theory of democracy that evaluates disparate 
‘democratic’ values and their justifications in order to suggest principles and values upon 
which the structure of a democracy ought to be based. 
 
1.10. What is Democracy? 
 
Democracy means government by the people. But what does that mean? No explicit definition of 
democracy is settled among political theorists or in the dictionary. On the contrary it is a matter of deep 
controversy what democracy really is.44 
 
Formulations like ‘government by the people’ or ‘popular sovereignty’ hints that a central 
feature of democracy is that the people rule themselves. Even if they do not do so directly, 
the foundation and source of political power is ultimately the people themselves. If this is the 
case, any political institution that is to exercise power or decide political matters must in 
some way be able to justify their legitimacy by tracing the sanctioning of their use of power 
back to ‘the people themselves’. 
 
There are a great many nations which are termed democracies, and they differ a great deal. 
Democracy is not a question of either-or, but rather a matter of degrees. This can also make it 
easier to incorporate another feature in political discourse: we often speak of democratic 
values. Oftentimes things like freedom, equality, rule of law and freedom of speech are cited 
as examples of values that democracies should uphold. Again, these values and their correct 
interpretation are of course subject to disagreement. This disagreement is, of course, not only 
political but also philosophical. And the different theorists of democracy I am discussing in 
this paper are all providing normative theories of democracy. They are importantly not 
attempting to describe or explain how societies we say are democratic are organised. 
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Normative democratic theory: “[…] Aims to provide an account of when and why democracy 
is morally desirable as well as moral principles for guiding the design of democratic 
institutions”.45 I am not going to pick up the former issue, but focus on the latter. The focus 
then will be on what values and principles the differing theories of democracy perceive as 
being the most important. And thus, what values and principles we should base the 
organisation of a democratic society on. 
 
1.11. What is Constitutionalism? 
As is the case for democracy there is no settled agreement on what constitutionalism actually 
entails nor how it is best conceived. But following the counter-majoritarian difficulty and its 
majoritarian premise, I take as my starting point that constitutionalism implies certain limits 
on majoritarian decisions. 
 
‘Democracy’ appears to mean something like this: Popular political self-government – the people of a 
country deciding for themselves the contents (especially, one would think, the most fateful and 
fundamental contents) of the laws that organize and regulate their political association. 
‘Constitutionalism’ appears to mean something like this: The containment of popular political decision-
making by a basic law, the Constitution […].46 
 
Put in this way the very notion of a constitutional democracy seems paradoxical. The limits 
on ‘democracy’ in this formulation is the idea of a ‘basic law’. In Deliberative Democracy 
and the Institution of Judicial Review, Christopher F. Zurn identifies four central pillars of 
constitutionalism: “the rule of law, a distinction between higher (entrenched) law and 
ordinary law, the establishment and arrangement of the institutions of government, and, the 
provision of individual rights”.47 Beginning with the rule of law, it means that governmental 
actions are subject to laws. 
 
It requires, in some form or another, that state actions be controlled by legal rules, or at least rulelike 
legal norms and standards rather than by the indiscriminate and unpredictable decisions of state 
officials operating in the absence of control by any pre-existing legal standards.48 
 
The main reasons for advocating a rule of law in this sense is to provide a predictable 
framework within which members of a society can act and plan, being able to know what 
                                                 
45 Christiano, (2015), “Democracy”. 
46 Michelman, Brennan and Democracy (2005), 6. 
47 Zurn, Deliberative Democracy and the Institutions of Judicial Review (2009),  84. 
48 Ibid., 86. 
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actions are permitted by the law and which are not. At the level of constitutional law, we are 
dealing with the basic framework of political and legal institutions: the scope of their power, 
and the relationship between them. 
 
The distinction between ‘higher’ and ‘ordinary’ law is exemplified by the special 
requirements for amending the Norwegian constitution. The degree to which higher law 
ought to be entrenched and harder to change than ordinary law is no settled matter, but the 
idea that constitutional law set forth a basic framework that ordinary law functions within, is 
connected both with the arrangement of governmental institutions and the notion of 
individual rights. In terms of the former, a constitution defines what the basic political 
institutions of a society are and what powers they have and do not have. One of the major 
reasons for structuring political institutions in a constitution is to help ensure that they are 
good political institutions. 
 
Constitutionalism, in explicitly allocating various types of political authority to different offices and 
diversely organised formal and informal political institutions, seeks to prevent predictable abuses of 
power: for instance, tyranny, oppression, official self-dealing, other forms of corruption, abuse of the 
powerless, repressive or discriminatory distributions of the benefits of government, and so on.49 
 
A constitution, then, does not only set the basic rules and limits for the political institutions, 
but ideally does this in a way that prevents unwanted, yet foreseeable, abuses of their power. 
This is closely connected with the final element of constitutionalism that Zurn highlights: 
individual rights. I have so far not discussed either judicial review, nor constitutionalism 
explicitly in terms of rights. Even though discussions concerning both are often framed in 
terms of rights. The basic idea is that a constitution can entrench certain important rights. A 
basic subdivision of these rights are political rights, that is, rights that secure a guarantee of 
equal political participation, and individual rights, meaning rights that protect an individual’s 
sphere of self-determination from interference from others.50 
 
This is not meant to be an exhaustive or complete account of constitutionalism. Rather, it is 
meant as a starting point from which to examine full-fledged theories of constitutional 
democracy. And in particular how they respond to the counter-majoritarian difficulty, both 
for judicial review and constitutionalism itself. Ronald Dworkin has attempted to defuse the 
counter-majoritarian difficulty. 
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In the following I am going to examine two different conceptions of democracy in more 
detail. One due to Ronald Dworkin (in chapter two), and the other due to Jeremy Waldron (in 
chapter three). The former argues for judicial review, while the latter argues against. Despite 
their different conceptions, I argue that both ultimately are problematic. Dworkin because he 
does not sufficiently include citizen’s participation in what the calls his partnership 
conception of democracy. Waldron, for his part, attempts to base his conception of 
democracy by marking the right to participation in government as the democratic right. 
However, I believe that Waldron’s account ultimately suffers because he does not want to go 
far enough in the direction of democracy. Chapter four is dedicated to a further discussion of 
the conceptions of democracy from Dworkin and Waldron. In particular I examine the 
legitimacy conditions for Waldron’s account. I will then present a suggestion from 
Hutchinson that he calls strong democracy as an approach that can make good on democracy 
and avoid the trouble Waldron gets into. Recommending an approach he calls strong 
democracy, Hutchinson suggests a democratic conception that would require significant 
changes in contemporary democracies, if they were followed. Finally, in chapter five, I argue 
that argument against strong judicial review, that are based on an understanding of 
democracy as participation in government, and that furthermore ties principles of legitimacy 
to citizen’s participation in government, will tend to imply a scepticism also towards an 


















Chapter 2: Ronald Dworkin; The Partnership 
Conception of Democracy. 
 
 
Ronald Dworkin (1931-2013) was a legal scholar and philosopher who wrote extensively on 
political philosophy and law. He was concerned with the nature of judicial interpretation, 
particularly constitutional interpretation, and was also a defender of strong judicial review. 
The latest development of his political philosophy can be found in Justice for Hedgehogs 
from 2011. Here he advances what he calls the partnership conception of democracy as an 
alternative to a majoritarian conception. This partnership conception is part of a larger thesis 
that Dworkin advances in Justice for Hedgehogs, the unity of values. 
 
In the following I will first examine central features of the unity of value thesis, and show 
how Dworkin’s partnership conception fits into this larger framework. I believe it is useful, in 
order, to understand Dworkin’s notion of democracy to place it within his theory on both 
ethics and morality, especially since he himself sees all of this as different parts of the larger 
field of value. I will then move on to the particulars of Dworkin’s conception and develop 
these by looking at an earlier book, Freedom’s Law, from 1996, where he argues that the 
collective actions of a democratic society, ought to be understood as a special kind of 
collective action. While the discussion in Freedom’s Law is undertaken in somewhat 
different terms and ways, the similarities to the conception presented in Justice for 
Hedgehogs is striking. Lastly I will deal with Dworkin’s view of judicial review. I take this 
rather circuitous route to judicial review because Dworkin is advocating for a definition of 
democracy that, if successful, would take the sting out of the charge that judicial review is 
anti-democratic. I will argue that Dworkin’s defence is not necessarily strong enough to argue 
for a system of strong judicial review. But that it nonetheless provide an interesting 
perspective that will also inform and challenge Jeremy Waldron’s attack on judicial review in 
the next chapter. 
 
2.1. The Unity of Value. 
 
Value is one big thing. The truth about living well and being good and what is wonderful is not only 
coherent but mutually supporting: what we think about any one of these must stand up, eventually to 
any argument we find compelling about the rest. I try to illustrate the unity of at least ethical and moral 
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values: I describe a theory of what living well is like and what, if we want to live well, we must do for, 
and not do to, other people.51 
 
The unity of value is a big thing indeed. In addition to the ethical and moral fields, Dworkin 
also sees political morality as part of the larger field of value. The position is an explicit 
rejection of value pluralism. It says that, despite appearances to the contrary, different values 
do not conflict with each other. 
 
For instance, freedom and equality are often thought to conflict. My freedom to do what I 
want is constrained by a government that prohibits, for example, the buying of votes. On this 
view, while such prohibitions may well be justified by demands of equality, it nonetheless 
requires us to balance different and conflicting values. The unity of value thesis holds that, 
properly understood, freedom and equality does not conflict. Rather than having to balance 
the demands of freedom against the demands of equality, these values will demand the same 
things. Provided we understand them correctly. In order to do this, Dworkin relies on an 
account of interpretation wherein any value concept ought to be interpreted in such a way that 
it supports and cohere other values. Together these different values form a mutually 
supportive network. For Dworkin, it is part of our ethical obligations to take up the challenge 
of constructing such a framework. Whether we succeed will be a matter of degrees, but the 
only thing that can support our moral values are, at the end of the day, other moral values. In 
line with unity of value thesis, this also applies to the ethical and political realm. In 
Dworkin’s words this thesis is: “[…] the hedgehog’s faith that all true values form an 
interlocking network, that each of our convictions about what is good or right or beautiful 
plays some role in supporting our convictions in each of those domains of value”.52 
 
2.2. The impossibility of external scepticism. 
Dworkin believes that coherence is an essential criterion for evaluating our value judgements. 
But he does not endorse a coherence theory of truth for value judgements. That is, a value 
judgement is not made true by virtue of coherence. Dworkin insists on the idea that moral 
convictions are truth-seeking.53 
 
                                                 
51 Dworkin, Justice for Hedgehogs (2011), 1. Dworkin uses the term “ethics” about individuals, it concerns what 
we ought to want to be and do in our lives. And he uses “morality” about how we ought to treat other people. 
When we make an ethical judgement, we judge our own or other’s conception the good life, and when we make 
moral judgements we judge how we ought to treat others. 
52 Ibid., 120. 
53 Ibid., 99. 
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That there are truths about value is an obvious, inescapable fact. When people have decisions to make, 
the question of what decision they should make is inescapable, and it can be answered only by noticing 
reasons for acting one way or another; it can be answered only in that way because that is what the 
question, just as a matter of what it means, inescapably calls for.54 
 
The claim that there are truths about values, and that this is an “obvious” and “inescapable” 
fact is rather surprising considering the impressive amount of energy that has been exerted by 
philosophers and others in the pursuit of answering this question. As far back as Socrates’ 
quarrel with the sophists about the nature of truth. But certainly, in later philosophy with non-
cognitivist theories in meta-ethics. The emotivism of A. J. Ayer and C. L. Stevenson, and 
then the quasi-realism of Simon Blackburn, and Allan Gibbards norm-expressivism, were all 
part of a project that explicitly rejected that value judgements, or more specifically, 
statements about value, could be either true or false. 
 
Non-cognitivist theories are an example of what Dworkin labels external scepticism. This is 
distinguished from internal scepticism in that the former raises questions about morality as 
such, while the latter raises questions of morality. The distinction is in philosophy known as 
first-order vs. second-order judgements or beliefs. For instance: my belief that punching 
Nazis in the face is wrong, permissible, or right, is a first-order moral judgement. My further 
belief that any judgement as to the wrongness or rightness of punching Nazis in the face is 
neither true or false is a second-order belief. First-order beliefs pose questions of morality, 
whereas second-order beliefs pose questions about morality. 
 
Dworkin rejects external scepticism wholesale. He argues that any answer we give to a 
question of morality or ethics are answers of morality and ethics, not about them. “Philosophy 
can neither impeach nor validate any value judgement while standing wholly outside that 
judgement’s domain”.55 For Dworkin there is no distinct meta-ethical field of philosophy, the 
question of whether there are moral truths is itself a substantive moral issue, not a meta-
ethical one.56 Dworkin’s project is to advance an ambitious version of a substantive moral 
theory that covers not only ethics and morality, but also politics. His starting point is the 
concept of dignity. 
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2.3. Dignity and its two principles. 
Dworkin’s strategy for illuminating and arguing for the unity of value thesis is to identify 
basic principles of ethics, and then show how these can be used to provide a substantive 
account moral theory that can encompass ethics, morality and political morality. 
 
Dworkin grounds his conception of ethics and morality in the concept of dignity. He defines 
dignity by advancing two basic and abstract principles: self-respect and authenticity. These 
two principles are fundamental for living well.57 Self-respect means that: “Each person must 
take his own life seriously: he must accept that it is a matter of importance that his life be a 
successful performance rather than a wasted opportunity”.58 Formulated a little differently, 
this principle require that we recognize the objective importance of our own lives. 
Authenticity demands that: “Each person has a special, personal responsibility for identifying 
what counts as success in his own life; he has a personal responsibility to create that life 
through a coherent narrative or style that he himself endorses”.59 
 
Formulated in this way the principles apply to the ethical realm, that is, they are principles of 
personal morality. Throughout Justice for Hedgehogs Dworkin develops and reformulates the 
two principles in the domain of ethics, morality, and politics. In the political domain, 
Dworkin’s formulation of the two principles of dignity is this: 
 
1) “[Government] must show equal concern for the fate of every person over whom it 
claims dominion”.60 
 
2) “[Government] must respect fully the responsibility and right of each person to 
decide for himself how to make something valuable of his life”.61 
 
Dworkin does not see the different formulations or domains as hierarchical, nor is one more 
fundamental than any other. Rather, in line with the unity of value thesis, they are all 
different domains within the larger field of value. 
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2.4. Collective action: statistical and communal. 
Dworkin sees political morality, the obligations we have by virtue of our membership of a 
political community, as derived from the moral obligations we create to other people through 
special acts like promising something. Politics is a distinct field because here we are not 
simply engaging with what we as individuals owe each other, but what we all owe each other 
as part of a distinct political entity. That is, the duties we collectively owe to each other 
because we are part of the same political community. For Dworkin: “Political obligation […] 
marks the transition from the personal to the political, because citizens acquit their political 
obligations in part through a separate, artificial collective entity”.62 
 
In Freedom’s Law, Dworkin answers the question of what this entity is by pointing to a 
particular form of collective action, namely, what he terms communal collective action. This 
is distinguished from statistical collective action. He defines statistical collective action as 
being a function of the individual actions of the group’s members. We can use the stock 
market as an example: certain stocks will have a higher or lower price depending on the 
individual actions of many different traders. But when we speak of what the stock market 
does it is not necessary to talk about a distinct agent that made these decisions. Any such talk 
can easily be replaced by speaking of the actions of individuals instead. 
Communal collective action, on the other hand, is distinguished by a kind of agency 
where the action cannot simply be reduced to the individual actions. Dworkin uses the 
examples of an orchestra or football team embodying this kind of communal collective 
action. For a football team to play well they must play as a team. The players of a football 
team aim to contribute to the performance of the team, and take part in a collective 
responsibility for the team’s performance.63 Communal collective action means that the 
members of a group see themselves as acting together in a special form of agency. “It is a 
matter of individuals acting together in a way that merges their separate actions into a further, 
unified, act that is together theirs”.64 
 
Membership in this communal sense is what Dworkin calls moral membership. There are 
certain conditions that, when they apply, will enable us to count an individual as a genuine 
member of a political community, capable of acting communally. Dworkin separates the 
conditions of moral membership into two: structural and relational. Structural conditions 
apply to the community as a whole and will include historical, cultural, and even 
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psychological facts about that community that makes it reasonable to consider it appropriate 
to count its members as moral members.65 For instance: “The political community […] must 
have been established by a historical process that has produced generally recognized and 
stable territorial boundaries”.66 Further conditions can attach to a shared culture, and political 
history. In short, structural conditions are those that would pick out a legitimate nation state  
(Whatever we take legitimate to mean in this context). 
 
Relational conditions are most important for my purposes here because they describe how 
individual members ought to be treated by the community for moral membership to apply. 
Dworkin says that: “A political community cannot count anyone as a moral member unless it 
gives that person a part in any collective decision, a stake in it, and independence from it”.67 
That we have a part in the collective decisions of our democracies for Dworkin means that we 
have an opportunity to make a difference in the decisions of our community and, importantly, 
that differences in the political power of different individuals “[…] must not be structurally 
fixed or limited in ways that reflect assumptions about his worth or talent or ability, or the 
soundness of his own convictions or tastes”.68 That we have a stake in our community means 
that it expresses “[…] some bona fide conception of equal concern for the interests of all 
members […]”.69 Which is to say that a community that shows insufficient concern for the 
consequences for some members compared to others, will not meet the conditions for moral 
membership. Per Dworkin, this point explains another significant intuition many share about 
a democracy: “[…] that a society in which the majority shows contempt for the needs and 
prospects of some minority is illegitimate as well as unjust”.70 
 
That we have independence from our community means moral independence to form and 
hold our own opinions, values, and views on what it means to lead a good life. Many issues 
of justice and law in a democracy must be decided collectively, and in those arguments some 
will inevitably lose. But on Dworkin’s view, a very important condition is that the majority 
does not lay claim to dictate an individual’s conception of the right life to lead. “Someone 
who believes in his own responsibility for the central values of his life cannot yield that 
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responsibility to a group, even if he has an equal vote in its deliberations”.71 This is the 
outline of what genuine membership of a political community entails in Freedom’s Law. 
 
In Freedom’s Law, the conditions for moral membership are not seen by Dworkin in 
connection to the larger unity of value thesis. But there are striking similarities in the 
conditions for moral membership and the two principles of dignity. Equal respect and 
concern are at work in both. The most important feature of this kind of membership for my 
purposes here is that it allows Dworkin to explain political legitimacy. 
 
A government has legitimacy over a political community in the case where it respects certain 
conditions. Where the conditions of moral membership are one step in this direction, the two 
principles of dignity can express a very similar point, but in a different, and perhaps, more 
refined way: “Governments […] can be legitimate if their laws and policies can nevertheless 
reasonably be interpreted as recognizing that the fate of each citizen is of equal importance 
and that each has a responsibility to create his own life”.72 
 
2.5. Rights. 
Recall that the principles of dignity I described earlier was first found in the ethical field. In 
moving to the political realm these principles are still important, but they must be 
(re)interpreted in terms of what distinguishes the political field, namely what obligations we 
all have to each other when we act in, and as, the artificial collective agent that Dworkin 
believes a legitimate political community is. This part also sheds light on Dworkin’s 
conception of rights.73 Where we in the ethical or moral realm more easily speak of 
obligations, the shift to speaking in terms of rights makes more sense in the realm of political 
philosophy. 
 
When we come to political morality […] rights plainly provide a better focus than duties or obligations, 
because their location is more precise: individuals have political rights, and some of those rights, at 
least, are matched only by collective duties of the community as a whole rather than of particular 
individuals.74 
 
                                                 
71  Ibid., 26. 
72 Dworkin, Justice for Hedgehogs (2011), 322. 
73  Ibid., 327-328. 
74  Ibid., 329. 
29 
 
Obligations and duties provide constraints on what would otherwise be a reasonable decision. 
Capturing the same idea in the political sphere, Dworkin suggests we ought to view rights as 
“[…] trumps over otherwise adequate justifications for political action”.75 
 
For instance, prohibiting certain kinds of political speech or indefinitely detaining people 
suspected of terrorist sympathies may be thought to make the society safer. But safety is not, 
on this view, a reason for enacting these policies as they would violate the political rights of 
its citizens. 
 
Conceiving of rights in this way means that the question of what rights we have, is also the 
question of what individual interests are so important that they trump almost all other 
considerations? The answer to this can be found in Dworkin’s partnership conception of 
democracy. 
 
2.6. Partnership vs Majoritarian conception of democracy. 
Dworkin distinguishes between two different conceptions of democracy. The partnership 
conception and the majoritarian conception. In Justice for Hedgehogs he defines the 
majoritarian conception like this: “The majoritarian conception holds that people govern 
themselves when the largest number of them, rather than some smaller group within them, 
holds fundamental political power”.76 Political institutions must be designed with this in mind 
for them to be democratically legitimate. Representative government, for instance, might be 
necessary in a complicated modern society, but features like regular and fair elections are 
meant to ensure that political decisions will be those that a majority prefers. This is what 
grants legislation its legitimacy. 
Dworkin's preferred option is the partnership conception: “[...] it holds that self-government 
means government not by the majority of people exercising authority over everyone but by 
the people as a whole acting as partners”.77 My previous discussion of communal collective 
action and moral membership give pretty solid hints as to what Dworkin means by this 
conception. But while the content is similar there is a twist. 
The unity of value thesis Dworkin is working with in Justice for Hedgehogs means that rather 
than being grounded in the qualifications for collective communal action, the partnership 
conception is grounded in the two principles of dignity. In terms of these, a political 
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community act as a partnership when they accept that they must act with equal respect and 
concern for all partners. Or in somewhat different terms: “If each accepts a standing 
obligation not only to obey the community's law but try to make that law consistent with his 
good-faith understanding of what every citizen's dignity requires”.78 This does not, however, 
require unanimity on what dignity requires, that is, what policies ought to be enacted. There 
will be disagreement over issues, but provided the members of a political community uphold 
the conditions of legitimacy they can form a partnership nonetheless. This obligation can be 
said to obtain when the fundamental conditions of legitimacy are respected. For Dworkin: 
 
A political community has no moral power to create and enforce obligations against its members unless 
it treats them with equal concern and respect; unless, that is, its policies treat their fates as equally 
important and respect their individual responsibilities for their own lives. That principle of legitimacy 
is the most abstract source of political rights.79 
 
In other words: Government must respect the two principles of dignity, for each and every 
person in the political community, in order to be a legitimate source of political obligations. 
The further question of what particular rights we have can be developed by examining what 
these abstract formulations actually require on different questions. “We fix and defend 
particular rights by asking, in much more detail what equal concern and respect require”.80 
I will now turn to Dworkin’s further development of the partnership conception and how our 
concepts of equality of political power and liberty can be interpreted in a way that makes 
sense of some of the dilemmas and paradoxes the majoritarian conception finds itself in. 
 
2.7. Equality of political power. 
Democracy demands an equality of political power. But what does this mean in practice? 
What does the demand for equal political power for all citizens actually amount to? Dworkin 
distinguishes three possible interpretations of political power: as influence, impact, and 
attitude. Equality of influence, according to Dworkin, means that all citizens have an equal 
chance that his or her preferred policies will be enacted. “Each of them has as great a chance 
as any other adult citizen that the opinions he brings to the political process will in the end 
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become law or state policy”.81 Impact, on the other hand, disregards the resources different 
citizens have to influence others. A citizen's political impact is a matter of whether or not the 
opinion he or she forms is given equal weight in the final decision. “A person's influence 
includes his power to persuade or induce others to his side, his impact is limited to what he 
can achieve through his own opinion without regard to what others believe”.82 
In terms of influence, leaders of political groups, as well as rich individuals, or even just 
people who are very persuasive, will be able to convince many more that their positions are 
the correct ones. Dworkin admits that some of these inequalities may be problematic, like the 
greater political influence afforded to wealthy citizens, but he argues in Freedom’s Law that 
in these cases it is not the inequality itself, but rather the source of the inequality that is 
problematic.83 For most cases, however, Dworkin believes that inequalities of influence are a 
feature of democracy that we cannot get rid of. Equality of influence would only really be 
possible in a dictatorship where the influence of ordinary citizens would be the same: non-
existent. 
 
But as equality of impact the case is no better, according to Dworkin. Democracies do not, 
and cannot, decide all matters by referendum. The majoritarian conception accepts 
representative democracy as a necessary compromise. According to Dworkin, however, it 
makes no sense why we should care about equality of impact. This is because the likelihood 
that my one vote will make any difference at all, in either a concrete political decision or in 
who gets elected to parliament, is vanishingly small, even in a country as small Norway.  
“People in a large community whose political impact is actually or close to equal have no 
more power over their own governance, just as individuals, than they would if priests took 
political decisions by reading entrails”.84 Dworkin's basic idea here is that any concrete 
attempt to find a metric of power, a way of measuring the difference each individual citizen 
can make, will fail because of the myriad of actual differences in political power. 
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So, according to Dworkin, our political power understood as equality of influence does not 
make sense. And our political power understood as equality of impact is so small as to not 
merit attention. Then why bother with political equality at all? Dworkin’s answer is, of 
course, the third interpretation, that of attitude. Here the equality we ought to be concerned 
with is that of the status of citizens, rather than their ability to make any real difference in 
political decisions as individuals. For Dworkin, political equality ought to mean this: “that no 
citizens have less impact than any other because of reasons that compromise his dignity”.85 
Eschewing any attempt at what he calls a mathematical conception of political equality, 
Dworkin sees the value of political equality in signalling the equal concern and respect for 
the members of a political community. 
 
If any citizen is assigned less electoral impact than others, either because he is denied a vote or they are 
given extra votes, or because electoral arrangements place him in a district with more people but no 
more representatives, or for any other reason, then the difference signals a lesser political standing for 
him, unless it can be justified in some way that negates that signal.86 
 
On this view, any policy that denies the vote to certain groups, either based on gender, 
wealth, education or any other justification, will most likely be illegitimate. But many 
inequalities will be perfectly allowable. Dworkin uses the United States and its problematic 
history of racial injustice as a reason that policies increase the chances of black 
representatives would be allowable, provided whites are not outright denied the vote. But 
even in this case it ought to be noted that the reason whites cannot be denied the vote is not 
because it would reduce their political power, but because of the symbolism of such a denial. 
Conceivably on this view, it is perfectly allowable to deny certain groups the vote, provided 
we find some appropriate way of countermanding the symbolism of such a denial. Though I 
will grant Dworkin that it is exceedingly hard to imagine what might countermand such a 
signal, given the emphasis in actual democracies on the right to vote and its importance. At 
any rate, Dworkin believes that the partnership conception can make better sense of the 
principle of equality of political power, than the majoritarian conception. 
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2.8. Liberty, positive and negative. 
Dworkin takes the same approach to the concept of liberty. A classic concept of liberty is 
John Stuart Mills definition of liberty as the freedom to do what one wants.87 On this view 
any government will necessarily limit our liberty. Any law or regulation whatsoever will 
infringe liberty: Meaning that while it may be necessary to prohibit murder we are 
nonetheless compromising on an important value. That the liberty or freedom of a community 
is eroded when a constitution hinders or restricts the range of decisions available to the 
majority, is perhaps most easily understood in terms of Isaiah Berlin’s distinction between 
negative and positive liberty. In the classical text “Two conceptions of Liberty”, Berlin 
defines negative liberty as the answer to the question: “What is the area within which the 
subject – a person or group of persons – is or should be left to do or be what he is able to do 
or be, without interference by other persons”. While positive freedom is the answer to the 
question: “What, or who, is the source of control or interference that can determine someone 
to do, or be, this rather than that”.88 For Berlin, these two conceptions of liberty were bound 
to clash. Defining negative liberty as being able to do what you want without interference 
from others, will necessarily conflict with any law. On this view, even though we have very 
good and valid reasons for prohibiting murder, we are nonetheless infringing on the 
(negative) liberty of the citizens. 
 
Dworkin cannot accept this on pain of abandoning the unity of value thesis. So while he 
employs the distinction between positive and negative liberty, he seeks to provide an 
interpretation of the terms that make them cohere rather than conflict. On Dworkin’s 
understanding the distinction between positive and negative liberty corresponds to two 
questions: “How can coercive government by a group larger than a single person be self-
government for everyone?”, and “If coercive government is legitimate at all, then how can we 
carve out some area of decision and activity that government has no right to regulate?”.89 
 
According to Dworkin, the answers to these two questions are theories of liberty because the 
second principle of dignity states that responsibility for our own lives are only compatible 
with governance by others when certain conditions are met. The answer to the first question 
is that everyone be allowed to participate, in the right way, in issues that concern them. The 
answer to the second question is that the political community cannot collectively decide 
issues that personal responsibility demands the individual decide for himself. 
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Dworkin says that: 
 
A theory of positive liberty stipulates what it means for people to participate in the right way. It offers, 
that is, a conception of self-government. A theory of negative liberty describes which choices must be 
exempt from collective decisions if personal responsibility is to be preserved.90 
 
In this way, Dworkin argues for the compatibility rather than the conflict of positive and 
negative liberty. The partnership conception explains positive liberty by interpreting the 
notion of self-government. Pointing to the basic conditions of legitimacy that must be in 
place so that a political community can properly be regarded as a partnership. Meaning things 
like universal adult suffrage, reasonably fair and free elections, as well as free speech, to 
mention a few. Negative liberty, on the other hand denotes those issues that cannot be subject 
to collective decisions, on pain of weakening the legitimacy of the democracy as a whole. 
These two conceptions of liberty are not in conflict, rather they are both necessary for 
democracy. Participation “in the right way” is very important here because these are 
conditions for the legitimate exercise of citizen’s influence on their government. 
 
2.9. The Partnership Conception and Representative, Constitutional Democracy. 
As presented by Dworkin, the majoritarian conception allows for representative democracy as 
a necessary evil. While we ideally would want rule by direct democracy, in a modern and 
complicated democracy this is not feasible. So, we implement protections like free speech, 
and fair elections, which are meant to ensure that we can be reasonably certain that the 
decisions made will be in line with the wishes of the majority. For Dworkin, the case is a 
different one. He believes that representative government is justified by a different metric. 
The test he proposes is that any differences in political impact must meet two conditions: 
 
(1) The first is that the difference “[…] must not signal or presuppose that some people are 
born to rule others”.91 
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According to Dworkin: “There must be no aristocracy of birth, which includes an aristocracy 
of gender, caste, race, or ethnicity, and there must be no aristocracy of wealth or talent”.92 
The second condition is tied to the conditions of legitimacy in a more substantive way: 
 
(2) Constitutional designs can create differences in impact, so long as they plausibly increase 
the overall legitimacy of the political community.93 
 
Given the larger framework that Dworkin is working with, constitutional arrangements and 
political institutions that provide a better protection of individual rights than their 
alternatives, entail no problem of democratic legitimacy. This is ultimately because 
legitimacy refers back to the substantive demands of the partnership conception. And 
provided these are fulfilled, there is no lack of democratic legitimacy. So how would 
Dworkin make sense of the legitimacy of representative democracy, according to these two 
conditions? In his words, the first condition is: 
 
“[…] automatically satisfied, however, by any constitutional arrangement that lower the political 
impact of all citizens across the board; there can be no suspicion of indignity to any person or group 
when an important decision is left to an elected parliament, rather than offered to the people at large in 
a referendum. If that decision counts as a partial disenfranchisement, it disenfranchises all unelected 
groups and persons equally”.94 
 
Representative democracy is then not a challenge to democratic legitimacy on the partnership 
conception. At least not according to the first condition. What about the second condtition? 
If it is true, as Dworkin argues that rule by legislature is better than rule by popular vote or 
town meeting in protecting rights, then the second condition is also met. 
This does lead to somewhat of a challenge, however. How are we to evaluate the 
latter claim? Dworkin admits of no easy answers to this: “Reasonable people and politicians 
will disagree about which such structures improve the chance that the community will show 
equal respect and concern for all and each. But that is the test the partnership conception 
offers, not the cruder mathematics of majority rule”.95 
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2.10. Judicial Review and The Partnership Conception of Democracy. 
I am going to present what I believe are Dworkin's main arguments for judicial review. In 
Justice for Hedgehogs, the explicit defence for judicial review is somewhat limited. For the 
most part his defence of judicial review can be said to lie in defusing the counter-majoritarian 
difficulty. The partnership conception is a theory of democracy that, if accepted, will make 
anti-majoritarian features of our democracies less prima facie worrisome. What matters is the 
twofold condition that they disenfranchise equally, that is privilege no aristocracy; and 
second that those institutions are likely to make the right decisions. For the case of judicial 
review, the first condition is satisfied so long as no one is barred from the judiciary on the 
basis of birth, wealth or talent. So that is likely to be satisfied in many countries. 
 
This is essentially the same as his treatment of representative government. The legitimacy 
conditions for political institutions that transfer power from the many to the few, are justified 
if (1) they do not signal any kind of aristocracy of birth, wealth or talent. And (2) they must 
also plausibly be more likely to protect the rights of individuals than their alternative. 
Legitimacy understood in this manner is a matter of degrees, not either/or. The value of 
universal suffrage for Dworkin is in its value as a signal that all members of the society are 
treated with equal concern and respect. As representative government does not assume any 
aristocracy or hierarchy of birth, wealth or talent, it does not violate the first requirement. 
And since it is at least plausible that representative government is better at protecting 
individual rights than rule by referendum or town hall, there is no defect in the democratic 
legitimacy of representative government. 
 
Dworkin makes the same basic case for judicial review. First, it does not signal any kind of 
aristocracy of birth, wealth or talent. This is because while judicial review may be a 
disenfranchisement of ordinary citizens, in that power is transferred form the legislature to 
the judiciary, it is not a selective disenfranchisement. It disenfranchises us all equally. For the 
United States, Dworkin answer the second question by saying that overall judicial review has 
led to better than decisions. While expressing disappointment in some recent supreme court 
decisions, he nonetheless: “[...] [B]elieve that the overall balance of its historical impact 
remains positive. Everything now turns on the character of future Supreme Court 
nominations. We must keep our fingers crossed”.96 
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As a counterfactual defence of judicial review, this is very hard to evaluate. As Dworkin, 
himself admits, questions about rights are usually quite difficult and complex. I will discuss 
some arguments for why the judiciary might be more likely to get things right in the section 
about Waldron, but for now I want to leave such empirical matters to the side. Instead I will 
examine the main arguments Dworkin levels in defence of the democratic legitimacy of 
judicial review 
 
I propose to call the first argument from equal disenfranchisement. Judicial review entails no 
aristocracy of birth, wealth or talent, and therefore pose no prima facie democratic legitimacy 
problems. Especially considering that there are other anti-majoritarian features of our 
democracy we are not, for the most part, similarly concerned with.  The executive branch, the 
administration, and the bureaucracy all entail a transfer of power from citizens or their 
elected representatives to institutions. And a representative democracy itself transfers power 
from citizens to their political representatives. If we argue that these transfers of power are 
legitimate in the case of the executive, but not in the case of judicial review, there is an 
inconsistency that must be addressed. Put another way: if we understand democratic 
legitimacy as majority rule, there are many features of contemporary democracies that are 
democratically problematic. Even if this is a matter of degrees, it would seem like you need a 
further argument as to why we need to worry so much about judicial review, but not, for 
instance, the executive branch. 
 
The next argument, I call the partnership argument. This is an implicit argument in that the 
partnership conception of democracy provides an alternative basis for democracy than that 
expressed in the counter-majoritarian difficulty. The partnership conception could potentially 
defuse the counter-majoritarian difficulty. To the extent that the partnership conception can 
show how and why a system of judicial review is no threat to the democratic character of a 
society, while preserving our most important democratic principles and values, it is a 
potentially powerful argument against the counter-majoritarian difficulty. Dworkin’s 
conception of democracy as those institutions that best respect and uphold the principles of 
dignity, does not attach democratic legitimacy to participation. 
 
A third argument is connected with the partnership argument, but it brings Dworkin's entire 
unity of value thesis into the picture. I call this the dignity argument. Dworkin's theory is 
built from the two principles of dignity. Ultimately the demand for a recognition of both 
responsibility and self-respect in the ethical, moral, and political domains is deeply 
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connected. This does not seem like a very strong argument, but it can, I believe be enhanced 
when viewed in direct relation to Dworkin's two principles of dignity. His conception is that 
human dignity fundamentally means recognizing the objective importance of your own life 
and, by extension into the moral domain, the objective importance of the lives of others. 
Furthermore, independence says we ought to consider it our responsibility to develop our 
own comprehensive ethical, moral and political conceptions. If we grant the collective the 
authority to overrule our own conceptions, then we jeopardize not only our sense of 
responsibility and independence, but our self-respect. 
 
Viewed in this light, judicial review is put in a stronger position than simply as the protector 
of a given set of rights. On this view, the entrenchment and judicial protection of rights does 
not only guard our political rights. They can also enhance our moral, ethical, and political 
lives overall. Because rights are of the same kind as moral obligations to ourselves and 
others, judicial review can be seen as a valuable enhancer of the features of the human 
condition that are necessary to uphold values like the equal worth of human beings. This 
argument does not say that judicial review is the only way to do this. But it can say that it is 
good way to do this, and one that does not, appearances to the contrary, pose a problem to our 
democratic commitments. Much of the force of this argument stems from, in my opinion, its 
considerations of broader democratic values and considerations that move well beyond an 
identification of democracy with simple majority rule. 
 
This formulation of the argument is my own and not one that Dworkin fleshes out in 
precisely these terms. But I believe it is a reasonable argument to draw out from his writings. 
It draws from his insistence that counter-majoritarian features of a democracy can be more 
democratically legitimate provided they reach decisions that respect the two principles. As an 
addendum to this, Dworkin's larger unity of value thesis says that there is a clear connection 
between our political, ethical, and moral lives. Which frankly seems like a obvious point to 
make. But Dworkin is hopeful that the unity of value thesis also gives us good reasons for 
being optimistic about improving and resolving our political disagreements. According to 
Dworkin, we are constructing a coherent conception of all values, all formed from the basic 





The next argument I want to discuss is what I call the Lifeboat argument. When speaking 
about the majority vote as a way of making collective decisions, Dworkin makes the case that 
a majority vote is not intrinsically fair. 
 
When a lifeboat is overcrowded and one passenger must go overboard to save the rest, majority vote 
 would seem close to the worst method of choosing the victim. Personal attachments and antagonisms 
 would play a role they should not play, and so a lottery would be much superior. Those attachments 
 and antagonisms spoil politics as well, but on a much larger scale, and this makes the idea that majority 
 vote is intrinsically or automatically fair in that context seem at lest dubious”.97 
 
There are two parts to this quote. The first is an argument against the intrinsic or automatic 
fairness of majority decisions. The second is an argument that the same, or at least similar, 
personal considerations that makes majority vote an unfair way of determining who gets 
thrown overboard are equally unfair when we make political decisions. The first claim, I 
believe, is not very controversial, nor as strong as Dworkin would like. The second is 
interesting, and I will address this question through a comment by Jeremy Waldron. 
 
In “A Majority in the Lifeboat” Jeremy Waldron attempts a reconstruction as to what the 
lifeboat example can be taken to show (ranked from strongest to weakest): 
 
1. It is silly to think that majority-decision is intrinsically fair or intrinsically valuable. 
2. It is not the case that majority-decision is ever intrinsically fair or intrinsically valuable. 
3. Majority-decision is not intrinsically fair or intrinsically valuable in all circumstances. 
4. Majority-decision is not intrinsically fair or intrinsically valuable in circumstances just like the 
lifeboat example.98 
 
Waldron then puts forth the conclusion that he believes Dworkin wants to reach: 
 
5. A definition that ties the term firmly to majority-decision is an unhelpful misconception of 
democracy.99 
 
Of the four reconstructions, it is really only (1) and (2) that would get Dworkin to his desired 
conclusion. Waldron says it is not clear how the lifeboat example could help to establish (1) 
or (2). It might show is something like (3) or (4), but these cannot support (5). 
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[…] [W]hat the lifeboat example might illustrate: It offers us an instance of a strange sort of case in 
which any enthusiasm we might have for majority decision might need to be qualified (for certain odds 
kinds of case). That’s conclusion (4) above. But that wont get us to (5); it doesn’t establish the 
inappropriateness of majoritarianism in general, let alone the “silliness” of associating it with 
democracy.100 
 
I agree that the lifeboat example does not really show what Dworkin would need it to, if what 
he is looking for is a knock-down argument against defining democracy as rule by majority 
decision. But it is not clear why he should need this. Regardless, I do believe the lifeboat 
example convincingly makes the case that a majority decision is not intrinsically fair. But 
neither do I believe that to be a very controversial question. 
The more interesting question to me here is the degree to which electoral politics can be 
spoiled by “personal attachments and antagonisms”. Assuming that we can understand 
“politics” here as electoral politics, then the accusation is that its participants are too easily 
led from honest deliberation and voting because of “personal attachments and antagonisms”. 
This signals a rather deep scepticism about electoral politics. Which is not to say that he is 
wrong. There are many good reasons to be sceptical about the behavior of legislatures and the 
politicians that inhabit them. Worries over democracy as mob rule, subject only to 
selfishness, political infighting, and other “attachments and antagonisms” are quite common. 
The basis for these are diverse, but for Dworkin it seems clear that he believes elected 
legislatures are more likely to fall prey to the personal attachments and antagonisms that spoil 
politics. And that supreme court judges are more resistant to these spoilers. Zurn describes 
Dworkin’s position like this: 
 
Because the legitimacy conditions concern individual rights and fundamental principles, they should be 
handled by an independent judiciary that has the requisite competences and lacks the distorting 
pressures of power blocs and private interests. […] Dworkin believes that legislatures cannot fill this 
role, as their debates are rarely of high quality with respect to fundamental moral priniciples, their 
decisions are often substantially influenced by power blocs, and they usually aim at compromises that 
undermine the deontic quality of principles.101 
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The last argument I call the argument from public debate. In Freedom’s Law, Dworkin says 
that when an issue becomes a subject for the supreme court it serves to enhance the public 
debate more than if it would have a been a case just for the legislature.102 It enhances it in a 
way that pays more attention to the questions of political morality. 
 
When an issue is seen as constitutional […], and as one that will ultimately be resolved by courts 
applying general constitutional principles, the quality of public argument is often improved, because 
the argument concentrates on the start on questions of political morality. Legislators often feel 
compelled to argue for the constitutionality and not just the popularity of measures they support, and 
Presidents or governors who veto a law cite constitutional arguments to justify their decisions.103 
 
That political debates have been enhanced by being made a constitutional issue is difficult to 
answer. But I think this point ought not be underestimated. A wider look on the kind of 
debates and deliberations that occur in connection with democratic institutions may show that 
they are more worthwhile, and democratic even in a majoritarian sense. But even if this is the 
case with judicial review, it is important to remember that we really are talking about strong 
judicial review. That is, the same kind of constitutional debate could conceivably be 
achieved, even if the judiciary only could make advisory decisions in review of legislation. 
Or it could be done through a legislature. Meaning that this may be an argument for 
constitutional review. But in order for it to be an argument for strong judicial review, or even 
judicial review as such.  Dworkin needs a further argument to the effect that there is a special 
judicial competence in evaluating such issues. The challenge might be even more challenging 
to Dworkin because he himself is explicit about the fact that the interpretations undertaken by 
judges, legislators and ordinary citizens are of the same kind. In Freedom's Law, he described 
this as the moral reading of the constitution. 
 
Most contemporary constitutions declare individual rights against the government in very broad and 
 abstract language […]. The mora reading proposes that we all - judges, lawyers, citizens – interpret and 
 apply these abstract clauses on the understanding that they invoke moral principles about political 
 decency and justice.104 
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Given that the moral reasoning that judges are engaged in is of the same kind we all engage 
with from time to time, then it is hard to see what argument could establish the special 
competency needed. Christopher Zurn asks somewhat leadingly: 
 
Is it really true that only judges have the requisite competence to detect and interpret basic moral 
principles that underlie the conditions we set on our collective political arrangements, and that this 
competence should be grounds for allowing them to not only set the basic terms and limits of 
subsequent debate but also decide the issue for a significant period of time?105 
 
Zurn suggests that a reason for this rather uncomfortable fact is that Dworkin operates with 
two different political processes in mind. One is a principled moral debate about the 
fundamental character and value of democracy, the other is concerned with the attempt of 
different individuals and groups to improve their lives.106 And this, as well, bases itself on a 
sceptical view of ordinary electoral politics. 
 
I will have more to say about this scepticism about electoral politics, and the optimism about 
the judiciary. 
 
For now, I will say that Dworkin’s conception of democracy captures a rather interesting 
notion, namely that democratic legitimacy is a substantive demand on the outcomes that a 
political community produce. A society is democratic if it respects the two principles of 
dignity. This conception rejects a view of democratic legitimacy that attaches it to a 
procedural ideal of participation. I turn now to Jeremy Waldron’s arguments against judicial 
review, and his conception of democracy. One that is expressly formed with the plurality of 
values in mind, rather than the unity of them. 
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Much of Jeremy Waldron’s work on political philosophy is dedicated to vindicating “the 
dignity of legislation”, and to present a “rosy” picture of the work of legislatures. His reason 
for doing this is to counter what he perceives as a widespread tendency in a great deal of 
political philosophy to adopt a very cynical view about legislatures, the politicians that work 
there, and the citizens that elect them. According to Waldron, this cynical view of electoral 
politics is often contrasted with an idealized picture of what goes on in judiciary when they 
are deciding issues of rights. 
 
His article “The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review” has been widely read and cited, 
and is an attempt to base a criticism of judicial review on rights. For Waldron, the 
fundamental democratic right is that of the right to participation. The degree to which 
democratic institutions are designed with popular participation in mind, the greater their 
degree of democratic legitimacy, according to Waldron. He begins his argument with the fact 
of disagreement, and the need to make collective decisions. This is what he calls the 
circumstances of politics.Waldron’s conception of democracy is geared toward the 
importance of democracy as self-government. This means that he is sceptical towards any 
institution that compromises this ideal. He rejects the democratic legitimacy of strong judicial 
review. In Freedom’s Law he seems to be recommending a democratic priniciple of 
legitimacy that would imply that constitutionalism is also democratically illegitimate 
institution. But he seems hesitant to actually go so far. And in the later “The Core of the Case 
Against Judicial Review” one of his assumptions about the societies in question is that they 
can have constitutional protections of rights. In other words: He does not go as far as his 
argument might recommend he does. 
 
Waldron is an opponent of strong judicial review, and his best argument against judicial 
review is founded upon some assumptions about both the legislative and judicial institutions, 
and a political community’s general commitment to individual and minority rights. I will 
begin with examining Waldron’s views on democracy and constitutionalism in general before 
presenting his argument against judicial review. I am also going to examine an interpretation 
of Waldron’s argument due to Christopher F. Zurn which takes the former to be committed to 
a quite radical scepticism towards constitutionalism as such, as well as judicial review. I will 
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argue that while there is grounds for this interpretation in Waldron, there is also a clear 
opening for an interpretation that is decidedly less ambitious. And I believe that Waldron’s 
later article “The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review” makes this interpretation more 
reasonable. Lastly in this chapter I will deal with a worry about the extent to which Waldron’s 
attempted “rehabilitation” of legislatures may go too far in rosy view, and a more general 
worry that is implicit in much of the defence of judicial review: the desire to guard against a 
tyranny of the majority. 
 
3.1. The circumstances of politics. 
In Law and Disagreement Waldron presents what he calls the circumstances of politics. They 
are meant to describe the basic conditions of political decisions. Waldron’s circumstances of 
politics are twofold: 
 
1) The felt need of the members of a political community to collectively decide 
many issues. There are certain goals or goods that can only be achieved 
through such collective decisions.107 
2) The persistence of deep and consistent disagreement on fundamental political 
issues.108 
 
Waldron illustrates the first condition with what is known as partial coordination problems 
used in game-theory to show the structure, and difficulty in acting together. Partial 
coordination problems are problems where both parties have their own preferred option, but 
most of all they prefer to settle on a common option. An example: Tom and Jerry have to 
decide where to go for a date. Tom prefers the football match; Jerry prefers the opera. But 
most of all they both prefer to go out together, rather than attend their preferred option alone. 
According to Waldron, this illustrates an important point about legislation in the 
circumstances of politics. For instance, while we all may agree that rape ought to be 
prohibited, the particularities of the law, like what is to count as consent, are subject to very 
real disagreements in our political communities. But laws against rape need to take a stand on 
such controversial particularities. And in such cases, it is preferable that we enact a 
conception, rather than limit ourselves to uncontroversial cases, even if the view enacted is 
one that some will disagree with. In the words of Waldron: 
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Reasonable people differ on matters like these. Yet each may have an interest – of the sort represented 
in a PC [Partial Coordination problem] – in sharing with others in society a common scheme of rape 
law that deals unequivocally with these matters, a scheme which sets a specific age of consent, which 
states whether mistakes have to be reasonable in order to be exculpatory, and so on. Each may prefer 
that these matters be settled even in a way that he opposes, if the alternative is no rape law at all (with 
everyone who has a view enforcing it as best he can), or a law confined only to those cases where it is 
uncontroversial in the community that a wrong has been committed.109 
 
The first condition of politics then is the need to settle on a common course of action. The 
second condition states that we must reach such a settlement amidst disagreement. Thus, the 
need to reach a decision that counts for all of us stands in tension with the fact that we 
disagree about what to do. This tension is heightened when we speak of constitutionalism and 
judicial review. It is one thing that we disagree about what our laws say about vagrancy and 
begging, quite another if we disagree about our basic political framework. That we live in 
pluralistic and liberal societies that, generally, see great value in respecting such disagreement 
simply adds to this tension. Waldron is clear that we ought to expect disagreement about 
fundamental ethical, moral, and political issues and principles. And further, that we ought not 
view such disagreement as a result of a failure of intelligence or powers of reasoning, nor as a 
result of bad-faith or selfish motivations. 
To contrast with Dworkin, he too sees disagreement as something that we must accept 
in a democracy. His principle of independence means that our comprehensive conception of 
the good life, questions of religion, giving to charity, and a myriad other issues, must be left 
for each individual to decide. Also in the case of rights, his emphasis on the need for 
interpreting abstract concepts and values means that there is room for disagreement, at least 
about the correct interpretation. But for Dworkin, there is an end to this room for 
disagreement. At the foundations of his theory is the idea that our values in different domains 
will lead to a unified and correct interpretation of contested values. Dworkin stipulates not 
only that there is a correct view of justice (which Waldron may very well agree with), but 
also that this is a view we will share if we all proceed in the correct manner of interpretation 
(i.e. proceeding from the two principles of dignity). I believe Waldron’s reply to Rawls’ 
position is apt also here: “But the need for a common view does not make the act of 
disagreement evaporate. Instead it means that our common basis for action in matters of 
justice has to be forged in the heat of our disagreements, not predicated on the assumption of 
a cool consensus that exists only as an ideal”.110 
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Furthermore, Waldron says that legislation we generally believe to have made our society 
more just; women’s suffrage and liberation, abolition of child labour, the dismantling of 
segregation, and more, were all fought for and, at least partially, secured in the circumstances 
of politics. And this took place in the midst of serious disagreement: “What is more, each of 
these legislative achievements claims authority and respect as law in the circumstances of 
politics, including the circumstance of disagreement as to whether it is even a step in the right 
direction”.111 
 
For Waldron, the fact of disagreement in our political community about basic principles and 
values ought not to be explained away, but taken as a challenge we must face. Dworkin called 
the view that the majority ought to prevail in every case a crude statistical view of 
democracy.112 To this Waldron responds that: 
 
What seems like the majoritarian obsession with statistics is […] the tribute that politics pays to the 
reality that social problems and opportunities confront us in our millions, not in the twos and threes that 
moral philosophers are comfortable with. And what seems like its impersonality is a commitment to 
equality – a determination that when we, who need to settle on a single course of action, disagree about 
what to do, there is no reasonable basis for us in designing our decision-procedures to accord greater 
weight to one side than to the other in the disagreement.113 
 
3.2. Waldron’s theory of democracy. 
In the words of Christopher Zurn: “Waldron argues for majoritarian aggregation of equally 
weighted votes as the most justifiable democratic process”.114 But, interestingly, Waldron 
argues that what is aggregated are not simply selfish desires or prepolitical interests, but our 
good-faith opinions about what is the best course of action. The fundamental reason for this is 
that Waldron identifies the ascription of rights, and by extension, citizen’s right to participate 
in their own governance as the basic democratic principle. 
 
The identification of someone as a right-bearer expresses a measure of confidence in that person’s 
moral capacities – in particular his capacity to think responsibly about the moral relation between his 
interests and the interests of others. The possession of this capacity – a sense of justice, if you like – is 
the primary basis of democratic competence. Our conviction that ordinary men and women have what 
it takes to participate responsibly in the government of their society is, in fact, the same conviction as 
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that on which the attribution of rights is based.115 
 
Waldron believes that if we regard each other as the bearers of rights, we must also recognize 
our mutual capacity for thinking about rights. The one entails the other. From this Waldron 
draws the implication that our capacity for thinking responsibly about rights also means that 
what we ought to participate in deciding what rights we have. Waldron draws the 
fundamental democratic right from the idea of self-governance. A democracy is collective 
self-government, and as such the basic democratic right becomes, for Waldron, the right to 
participation. “Democracy requires that when there is disagreement in a society about which 
a common decision is needed, every man and woman in the society has the right to 
participate on equal terms in the resolution of that disagreement”.116 Of course, in our actual 
societies it is not feasible to institute direct democracy on all decisions. I will elaborate on 
this when discussing Waldron’s views on representative democracy, but for now I want to 
emphasize that he sees it as vital that the justification for political structures and processes 
that may compromise this ideal, nonetheless are rooted in the demand for a right of all 
members of a society to participate in the resolution of political disagreements that affect 
them. Waldron says that: 
 
The processes that this involves [resolving disagreements] may be complex and indirect; there may be 
convoluted structures of election and representation. But they are all oriented in the end towards the 
same ideal: participation by the people – somehow, through some mechanism – on basically equal 
terms. This means that there cannot be a democracy unless the right to participate is upheld, and unless 
the complex rules of the representative political processes are governed, fundamentally, by that right. If 
some are excluded from the process, or if the process itself is unequal or inadequate, then both rights 
and democracy are compromised.117 
 
Waldron argues that the right to participate (which he takes to be the same as the right to 
vote) is  grounded in the recognition that we as citizens can be bearers of rights. Our capacity 
as rights bearers entails that we can also deliberate and decide issues of rights. We have a 
right to participation because it is the extent of our duties that are being decided. That these 
decisions impact us in important ways is a strong argument for us to demand that we have a 
say in the decision. Or in Waldron’s somewhat weaker words, thus accounting for the 
counter-majoritarian features of actual democracies: “[…] I have a right to a say in the 
decision-mechanisms which control their [our duties] orchestration”.118 This is not to say that 
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a single vote will satisfy the right to participation. The right to participation is not just any old 
majoritarian element in a state structure. For instance, a system of benevolent absolutism, 
even if it is combined in some way with an elected body that has some measure of influence, 
is not sufficient to satisfy the right of participation. It is important for Waldron that the 
popular element is decisive. 119 In addition, the demand for participation is not simply an 
individual matter. It extends to all rights bearers, meaning all citizens. This adds a further 
requirement of participation, that it be fair. Demanding a right to participation implicitly 
acknowledges that my voice is not the only one in society, and that my voice ought to count 
no more or less than the voices of other right-bearers.120 
 
In “The Liberty of the Ancients Compared with that of the Moderns” Benjamin Constant 
makes the point that given the scale even of his contemporary society were such that there is 
a real question to be asked if our individual political power is really something that is 
significant. It certainly does not feel significant: 
 
His personal influence is an imperceptible part of the social will which impresses on the government its 
direction… Lost in the multitude, the individual can almost never perceive the influence he exercises. 
Never does his will impress itself upon the whole; nothing confirms in his own eyes his own 
cooperation.121 
 
In terms of the equality of political power Waldron goes a very long way in agreeing with 
Dworkin in that the harm done to me if I am denied the right to participation, is not connected 
to any loss of either political impact or influence as Dworkin defines the terms. In discussing 
a hypothetical citizen, that is excluded from a decision about his rights, Waldron says that he 
will feel slighted, but that: 
 
To feel this insult does not require him to think that his vote – if he had it – would give him substantial 
and palpable power. He knows that if he has the right to participate, so do millions of others. All he 
asks – so far as his participation is concerned – is that he and all others be treated as equals in matters 
affecting their interests, their rights, and their duties.122 
 
But Waldron nonetheless insists that while the scale of a society will make my single votes 
impact vanishingly small, this is no reason to ignore that there actually is an impact. 
Comparing it to other forms of collective action among large numbers of people he says that 
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while I may not be able to identify any contribution I make one way or the other, this does 
not entail that I am entitled to ignore the burden of participation in collective decisions. 
 
Though it is true that the enterprise does not require the participation of absolutely everyone (and so it 
does not require my participation, provided enough others take part), still there is no reason of fairness for 
me in particular to relieve myself of the burden of participation, given that the participation of most 
[citizens] is required.123 
 
This is not to say that we have a duty to participate, the burden of participation meant here is 
simply the cost of time or effort political participation requires. As an example, the 
municipality of Oslo have the possibility of temporarily prohibiting the driving of cars that 
run on diesel fuel as a measure to reduce air pollution on days when the air quality is 
particularly bad. Leaving political controversies and potential fines aside, Waldron’s 
argument would be that while it is true that my individual contribution to the air quality is 
negligible by itself. I am still not entitled to ignore my responsibility not to drive a diesel 
fuelled car, simply because of the scale of the problem. The feeling that participation in 
political processes on a large scale are impersonal and pointless viewed from the individual 
perspective is a consequence of trying to use small scale ideas about agency and 
responsibility where they are not appropriate. Thus, this feeling is not a consequence of 
majoritarianism. 
 
Because we live side by side with millions, we must address our common problems on that sort of 
scale. If we believe that everyone affected by a problem has a right to a say in its solution, then there is 
nothing to do but set up a procedure for counting, and somehow assessing millions of individual 
opinions.124 
 
So, while Waldron admits that the difference a single vote makes in a majoritarian decision is 
vanishingly small, he nonetheless insists that it is an important difference, nonetheless. And 
that this is not captured, if we like Dworkin, see voting simply as a signal or symbol of the 
equal importance of all members of a political community. This being said, Waldron 
approvingly cites Dworkin’s conception of communal collective action. Here Waldron makes 
the point that true membership of a democracy is not simply a matter voting or other forms of 
formal participation. A vote will not make up for one’s interests being persistently ignored by 
the community of which he is a member.125 Underlining the importance of rights for 
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Waldron’s conception of democracy he says that in exercising our right to participation we 
have an impact on the lives of our fellow citizens. “Having this impact on others is 
permissible only under certain conditions, and those conditions may be represented as rights 
held by anyone who is liable to be subject to such impact”.126 Primarily these are conditions 
like free speech and freedom of association, rights that enable “a broader deliberative context 
in civil society for formal political decision-making”.127 Which is to say that just because I 
have a vote, does not mean that I cannot criticize political structures for their lack of 
democracy or equality. To elaborate on this point, I would say that Waldron here also points 
to broader considerations of the kind of structures and rights that – under the imperfect 
organisation of representative democracy as the expression of the will of the people – make it 
more reasonable to argue that politicians in a legislature can represent the citizenry in a 
meaningful way. Something that is important for Waldron’s defence of legislatures as a forum 
for the expression of the will of the majority, and the dissent of the minority, to hold up. 
 
3.3. Waldron on Representative democracy. 
A great deal of Law and Disagreement, as well as many other of Waldron’s writings in 
political philosophy is concerned with what might be called a rehabilitation of legislatures 
and legislation. It is Waldron’s contention that much of political philosophy has been 
operating with an idealized view of the judiciary and an unduly negative view of the 
legislatures. One example of this is that many legal scholars and philosophers treat the 
legislature as a single agent, and talk of the intention of a statute, disregarding the fact that 
legislatures are pluralistic and rarely agree on what the intention of a statute is, even if they 
agree that it ought to be enacted. Something that is more relevant to my concerns here is 
Waldron’s view that in debates about constitutional entrenchment of rights and judicial 
review, many theorists view the supreme court as an enlightened forum of principle, suitable 
for reasoning about the truth of what rights we have and what they entail. While legislatures 
are places of self-interested haggling, unfit for any kind of principled and reasoned debate. To 
be clear, it is not that Waldron believes we necessarily need to be less cynical of legislatures 
or electoral politics. But rather that if we are to be cynical about legislatures, then we ought to 
be equally cynical about the judiciary. When we are debating actual societies, this will also be 
a question of the actual conditions of that society. That is, to what extent has the legislature 
and courts proved themselves to merit either optimism or scepticism? If one or both merit 
scepticism, then this is important for any evaluation of their democratic legitimacy. And 
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Waldron would not advocate for the wonderful deliberations of legislatures in societies where 
their particular legislatures have proven themselves to be anything but. Waldron’s argument 
against judicial review is limited to societies we would generally count as democratic, and I 
will return to this point in my discussion of Waldron’s arguments against judicial review. 
 
In principle, Waldron believes that cynicism about legislatures is unwarranted. The 
background conditions of this optimism are, of course, the circumstances of politics. 
Especially the circumstance of reasonable disagreement means that legislatures are in fact 
very well placed to deal with the issues we need to decide collectively in a way that respects 
disagreement, rather than pathologize it. Waldron’s positivity about legislatures lie in their 
ability to represent the diverse opinions of us as citizens. Importantly: “Legislatures in the 
modern world do not just assemble and vote. They deliberate: that is, their members talk to 
one another about the measures they are considering”.128 That this deliberation takes place 
among people who fundamentally disagree with each other explains the various rules for 
debate and decisions we find in legislatures. Christopher Zurn lays out Waldron’s case for 
legislatures as a good way of dealing with the circumstances of politics in three distinct 
considerations: 
 
1) The large number of representatives and the diversity of opinions reflect the 
diversity of opinions in the electorate. 
2) The rules that regulate debate and voting in a legislature are designed to reach an 
authoritative decision in the face of disagreement. 
3) Majority rule is a non-arbitrary way of respecting the diversity of opinions.129 
 
The first argument is based on the circumstance of disagreement, the second is concerned 
with the ability to reach a decision without assuming agreement on either principles or 
concrete statutes, and the third focus on the idea that in addition to being a successful 
technical device for deciding in issue, majority rule as a principle carries with it a normative 
foundation. Compare, for instance, tossing a coin and voting. Both are decision procedures 
that do not, prima facie, privilege one view over another. And as such they both respect 
disagreement. But Waldron’s right of participation gives us additional reasons for preferring a 
majority vote over tossing a coin, beyond the fact that tossing a coin can be more likely to 
lead to worse outcomes. One thing that should be noted here, however, is that in the end 
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representative government does end up being a necessary evil as compared to direct 
democracy. One that is justified, given the scale and complexity of our societies, but an evil 
nonetheless. 
 
Furthermore, is the issue to what extent it is reasonable that a representative, elected 
legislature can be a mirror of the larger demos as Waldron wishes. It is possible, without 
being unreasonably cynical, to point out ways in which members of legislatures openly or 
covertly attempt to corrupt the representative part of government. 
 
3.4. Waldron on Constitutionalism. 
It is, unfortunately, somewhat unclear what Waldron actually believes about 
constitutionalism. To begin with, Waldron is very critical of the view of constitutional 
precommitments as a situation in which the members of a political community bind 
themselves to a set of rights so that they do not later, in a state of panic or fear, violate those 
same rights. A metaphor of this kind of constitutional precommitment on the part of a 
political community is due to Jon Elster. In Ulysses and the Sirens Elster compares a 
constitutional precommitment to Ulysses ordering his crew to bind him to the mast so that he 
could resist the song of the sirens. Waldron believes this is an extraordinarily unhelpful 
image, partly because it compares a political community to a single agent, and partly because 
it compares the desire for later changes to a kind of weakness of the will. This is what 
Waldron speaks of as pathologizing disagreements. If the political body really is Ulysses, and 
his intention to not give in to the siren song is the rights protected in the constitution – that 
would make anyone disagreeing with the set of rights protected by the constitution Ulysses 
under the influence of the siren song. This is a problem because it labels disagreements about 
constitutional rights as an error, ignoring that we are always disagreeing about what rights we 
ought to have or not, including what rights ought to be protected by a constitution (if any). 
Particularly the latter ignores the circumstance of disagreement. 
Against Ulysses, Waldron sets out Bridget. Bridget is torn between competing 
conceptions of religious belief. One day she decided on a traditional faith in a personal God. 
Her commitment to this view is such that she locks the door of her library of theological 
books and gives the key to a friend, saying that the friend ought under no circumstances to 
return the key, even if Bridget were to ask, insist, or beg. Predictably, Bridget’s confidence 
that she has chosen the correct conception falters, and she asks for the key back.130 The 
difference between Bridget and Ulysses is that it is clear that Ulysses is not a rational actor. 
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When he begs to be released from his bonds he is expressly not rational. The same is not the 
case for Bridget. For her friend to deny Bridget the key would, according to Waldron, be to: 
“[…] take sides, as it were, in a dispute between two or more conflicting selves or two or 
more conflicting aspects of the same self within Bridget, each with a claim to rational 
authority”.131 Ulysses under the influence of the siren’s song is not rational and so has no 
such claim. 
 
In general Waldron seems very critical of any kind of constitutional controls on the 
deliberations and decisions of the citizens of a democracy. The reason for this is, 
fundamentally, his identification of democracy with the right of participation, that is, citizen’s 
ability to responsibly participate in the collective decisions of the political community. 
 
The identification of someone as a right-bearer expresses a measure of confidence in that person’s 
moral capacities – in particular his capacity to think responsibly about the moral relations between his 
interests and the interests of others. The possession of this capacity – a sense of justice, if you like – is 
the primary basis of democratic competence. Our conviction that ordinary men and women have what 
it takes to participate responsibly in the government of their society is, in fact the same conviction as 
that on which the attributes of rights is based- […] We are not entitled to secure stability at the cost of 
silencing dissent or disenfranchising those who express it. And we should not use the ideas of 
constitutional caution or constitutional commitment as a way of precluding effective deliberation on a 
matter on which the citizens are still developing and debating their views.132 
 
And furthermore, he says that while it may seem good to us now to enshrine a particular view 
on rights, it is plausible that later generations will want to change that view. Any framers of a 
precommitment ought to, says Waldron: 
 
[…] Ask themselves: is there a reason now to doubt that this provision will seem reasonable as a 
precommitment to those whom it constrains in the future? It seems to me that the existence of good 
faith disagreement about the content of the precommitment at the tome that it is proposed is always a 
reason for answering that question in the affirmative.133 
 
Waldron is clearly on the populist side of this debate, but it is, as I said, somewhat unclear to 
what degree. His clear emphasis on the value of majority rule as a neutral decision procedure 
in the controversial circumstances of politics suggests that he would be sceptical of any 
entrenchment of higher or constitutional law. In Law and Disagreement, Waldron certainly 
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appears to be very sceptical of constitutional entrenchment. 
 
While Waldron may accept a basic constitutional document, as well as a bill of rights, it 
seems that he would not accept that it would be harder to change constitutional law than 
ordinary law. So, for instance, to require a supermajority to change or amend a constitutional 
document would be democratically illegitimate. But he also says this about the possibilities of 
implementing procedures that slow down or hinder the process of legislation: 
 
The legislative process may be made more complex and laborious, and in various ways it may be made 
more difficult to revisit questions of principle for a certain time after they have been settled. (Such 
‘slowing-down’ devices may also be supported in the political community by values associated with 
‘the rule of law’.) None of this need be regarded as an affront to democracy; certainly a ‘slowing-down’ 
device of this sort is not like the affront to democracy involved in removing issues from a vote 
altogether and assigning them to a separate non-representative forum like a court. However, as I argued 
in chapter twelve, democracy would be affronted by any attempt to associate such ‘slowing down’ with 
the idea that there is something pathological about one side or the other in a disagreement of 
principle.134 
 
This quote suggests that Waldron’s scepticism about constitutional entrenchment may be 
construed as less radical than it first seems. Christopher F. Zurn interpretation of Waldron 
places him squarely in the radical side of the argument. On Zurn’s view, Waldron would 
object to any form of entrenchment of higher law, even in cases that relate to rule of law (like 
wrongful imprisonment or right to a fair trial) as well as the design and division of power 
between different governmental and judicial institutions.135 But as Zurn himself notes, 
Waldron ought to be in favour of some kinds of entrenchments, and there is some uncertainty 
as to what Waldron’s actual commitments are. This does not, however, convince Zurn that 
Waldron is not against constitutional entrenchment as such, and he describes him as sceptical. 
He also takes Waldron to explicitly reject the constitutionalization of a bill of rights.136 
I do believe, however, that Zurn’s interpretation of Waldron sees his position as more radical 
than it necessarily is. To a large degree this is Waldron’s own fault, as he does not explicitly 
say what he thinks about the rule of law, nor the structurations of political institutions. He is 
squarely focused the issue of rights. And he has, especially in Law and Disagreement, few 
good things to say about constitutional entrenchments. But in “The Core of the Case Against 
Judicial Review”, one of his assumptions about the kind of societies his arguments against 
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judicial review can apply is that the society has a genuine commitment to rights: 
 
[W]e may assume also that the society cherishes rights to an extent that has led to the adoption of an 
official written bill or declaration of rights of the familiar kind. […] This is supposed to correspond to, 
for example, the rights provisions of the U.S. Constitution and its amendments, the Canadian Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms, the European Convention in Human rights (as incorporated, say, into British law 
in the Human Rights Act), or the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act.137 
 
While Waldron does not believe that constitutional entrenchment of rights is necessary for a 
society to be committed to rights in the proper way, he does not reject it outright in “The Core 
of the Case Against Judicial Review”. One reason for this is that bills of rights do not simply 
specify a list of concrete rights that citizens have. I believe Waldron can accept a 
constitutionally entrenched bill of rights as democratically legitimate because such bills of 
rights do not give clear answers to questions about what rights its citizens have or don’t have. 
Following Dworkin, we could say that they may partly state concrete rights (e.g. the right to 
vote), but they will also contain abstract principles and rights that will be subject to 
disagreement in the society. Takin this approach, Waldron could argue that the entrenchment 
of a bill of rights is no problem to its democratic legitimacy, because it does not decide the 
issue. Democratic legitimacy rears its head as a challenge only when we have to decide this 
or that concrete issue of rights. In this context, it is not the entrenchment of a commitment to 
rights that is problematic, the problem arises when we give unelected judges the final word in 
decisions about what rights we actually have. Because it is at this point that members of the 
political community can claim that their voice has been ignored in this decision. 
 
In the following I will first present the argument against strong judicial review in “The Core 
of the Case Against Judicial Review”, before examining Zurn’s reconstruction of the formal 
argument he believes Waldron makes. I will argue that Zurn’s interpretation, while legitimate 
(given the ambiguity of Waldron’s theory of democracy), puts Waldron in the position of 
articulating a wholesale rejection of constitutionalism in favour of majority rule. I also 
believe that Zurn’s central objections to this argument can be better dealt with by a weaker 
version of the argument than the one Zurn reconstructs. Waldron’s views as expressed in 
“The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review” also gives reasons to believe that the weaker 
version is one that Waldron himself would prefer. 
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3.5. Waldron on Judicial Review. 
Waldron is decidedly of the opinion that strong judicial review is lacking in democratic 
legitimacy. His argument is, however, limited to societies that fulfil fairly stringent conditions 
in terms of their democratic character and culture. These are presented in “The Core of the 
Case Against Judicial Review”: 
 
1) Democratic institutions in reasonably good working order, including a representative legislature 
elected on the basis of universal adult suffrage. 
2) A set of judicial institutions, again in reasonably good working order, set up on a nonrepresentative 
basis to hear individual lawsuits, settle disputes, and uphold the rule of law. 
3)A commitment on the part of most members of the society and most of its officials to the idea of 
individual and minority rights. 
4) Persistent, substantial, and good-faith disagreement about rights (i.e., about what the commitment to 
rights actually amounts to and what its implications are) among the members of the society who are 
committed to the idea of rights.138 
 
In short, these are conditions meant to pick out modern constitutional democracies like 
Norway, the United States, and the U.K, to mention a few. Waldron is also arguing against 
strong judicial review. In this debate, he distinguishes between two kinds of arguments for or 
against judicial review: Outcome-related and process-related. Outcome-related reasons are 
those connected with reaching the right decision. Ronald Dworkin’s main reason for 
supporting judicial review, at least as he presents it in Justice for Hedgehogs, is of this kind. 
He believes that, on balance judicial review in the U.S. has led to better decisions on rights, 
than would have happened if it did not take place. Process-related reasons on the other hand 
are not concerned with outcomes but with deciding who is and who is not allowed to be part 
of the decision, independently of what their opinions on the matter is. Especially important 
here will be considerations that deal with the fairness of a given decision procedure. I will 
deal with outcome-related reasons, before moving on to process-related reasons. 
 
3.6. Outcome-Related Reasons. 
Outcome related reasons are often associated with the case for judicial review.139 But 
Waldron believes this is a mistake. According to him, outcome-related reasons can cut in both 
directions. While legislatures are sometimes vulnerable to overreaches of power that rights 
are meant to guard against, courts can be problematic in other ways when we consider 
outcome-related reasons. Waldron specifically mentions that courts can have a difficult time 
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dealing directly with the moral issues cases about rights represent, focusing instead on things 
like legal precedent and textual interpretation140 
 
Waldron discusses three kinds of outcome-related reasons in favor of judicial review: 
orientation to particular cases, orientation to a bill of rights, and that they are required to give 
reasons for their decisions. 
 
In a system of strong judicial review, concrete individual cases of potential rights violations 
are brought before the supreme court. This is an advantage for courts because they are 
confronted with actual cases of potential injustice. But Waldron argues that this is mostly a 
myth. Speaking about the U.S. judicial system he says that: 
 
By the time cases reach the high appellate levels we are mostly talking about in our disputes about 
judicial review, almost all trace of the original flesh-and-blood rights-holders has vanished, and 
argument such as it is revolves around the abstract issue of the right in dispute. Plaintiffs or petitioners 
are selected by advocacy groups precisely in order to embody the abstract characteristics that the 
groups want to emphasize as part of a general public policy argument”.141 
 
When we are talking about judicial review, deliberations and cases are concerned with highly 
abstract discussions of political and legal principles. And it is not as if legislatures are barred 
from considering concrete cases. Both in hearings and deliberations politicians frequently use 
actual or hypothetical examples of how a decision about rights might affect individuals. 
 
As for the judiciary’s orientation to a bill of rights, the issue here is that it is not the case that 
a bill of rights settles the issue. This is a matter of disagreement and interpretation. Nor is it 
clear that this makes the case any better for judicial review. For instance, excessive 
orientation to a particular text and some canonical form of words may obfuscate, rather than 
clarify the issue. I believe, for instance, that it is at least debatable how the obsession with the 
formulation of the right to bear arms has been enriched by discussions about what literal 
meaning of the second amendment really is. Waldron also points out that: 
 
At the very least, courts will tend to be distracted in their arguments about rights by side arguments 
about how a text like the Bill of Rights is best approached by judges. American experience bears this 
out: The proportion of argument about theories of interpretation to direct argument about the moral 
issues is skewed in most judicial opinions in a way that no one who thinks the issues themselves are 
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important can possibly regard as satisfactory.142 
 
Waldron suggests that this, in part, is because judicial review is so controversial. In order to 
maintain the image of the judiciary as dispensing neutral legal decision, rather than 
controversial political decisions, the real issue can become obfuscated. In the words of 
Waldron: “Because judges (like the rest of us) are concerned about the legitimacy of a 
process that permits them to decide these issues, they cling to authorizing texts and debate 
their interpretation rather than venturing out to discuss moral reasons directly”.143 This is also 
quite similar to Dworkin’s criticism in connection with his idea of a moral reading in the 
constitution. 
 
That a benefit of judicial decision-making is that they state their reasons is quickly dispatched 
by Waldron.144 Nor is it much of a defence of judicial review, and I don’t know if many have 
actually held it. Suffice it to say that legislators also give reasons for their opinions and 
decisions. And, again, provided that legislators and judges are engaged in the same 
endeavour, there is no prima facie reason to prefer legal reason-giving rather than more 
broadly political or moral reason-giving. 
 
A fourth consideration that Waldron does not deal with, but that I want to consider 
nonetheless, is that judges, by virtue of their education and legal experience are better suited 
to evaluating cases of rights than legislators (or philosophers or ordinary citizens for that 
matter). One way of specifying this is to say that judges are better at leaving aside prejudices, 
private attachments and antagonisms when deciding cases. These are considerations that, in 
Dworkin’s word, can “spoil politics”. To begin with, there is little doubt that judges are better 
at deciding cases of judicial review, qua legal cases. To interpret the law and relevant 
precedents, as well as evaluating the cases made by the lawyers on either side of the case, as 
well as writing their decisions or dissents, is after all what judges are trained to do. But a case 
of judicial review is not an ordinary criminal case or civil suit. An important consideration is 
that a constitution and bill of rights does not clearly settle matters of rights one way or the 
other. This means that decisions about rights, whether made in courts or legislatures, are 
political decisions, in large ways and small they influence the policies and statutes of a 
political community. Courts use different language, and to a certain extent, different 
arguments, than legislators or ordinary citizens, but they are political. Politics of a different 
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kind that what happens in the legislature, but politics nonetheless. To maintain that such 
questions are best left to judges is a position that is vulnerable to charges of paternalism. It is 
often easier to assume that disagreement is not reasonable, that those who disagree with me 
are not just wrong, but wrong for the wrong reasons, such as selfishness, prejudice, stupidity, 
contrarianism, and privilege. In the cases where this truly is the case, we might have some 
reason to be optimistic about judges’ ability to sort out the reasonable arguments from the 
unreasonable arguments. But a defence of judicial review that assumes that this is the rule, 
rather than the exception, seems to me overly sceptical about the reasoning powers of both 
citizens and legislators. Judicial review is not an institution that will guarantee and protect 
treasured liberal rights like free speech in all circumstances. As Waldron says: “A practice of 
judicial review cannot do anything for the rights of the minority if there is no support at all in 
the society for minority rights”.145 The case in which this might be true is when an elite of 
judges and politicians have a serious commitment to rights, but the majority of a society does 
not. In this case, the fact that judges are not subject to popular elections make them less 
vulnerable to public pressure, and therefore more likely to protect a minority. Of course, this 
view of the distribution of concern for rights is literally elitist. In actual societies this might 
be the case or it might not. But if we think that modern democracies are of this kind, and that 
we need strong judicial review to limit the problem, then most arguments for the institution 
would take on a different tone. As Waldron says: 
 
Maybe there are circumstances – peculiar pathologies, dysfunctional legislative institutions, corrupt 
political cultures, legacies of racism and other forms of endemic prejudice – in which the cost of 
obfuscation and disenfranchisement are worth bearing for the time being. But defenders of judicial 
review ought to start making their claims for the practice frankly on that basis – and make it with a 
degree of humility and shame in regard to the circumstances that elicit it. rather than preaching it 
abroad as the epitome of respect for rights and as a normal and normatively desirable element of 
modern constitutional democracy.146 
 
At the end of the day, outcome-related reasons for or against judicial review are, in my 
opinion, highly problematic to evaluate. It is difficult to imagine how we could even 
empirically go about evaluating this. Historically, both courts and legislatures have made 
decisions we now consider either good or bad or somewhere in between. It is beyond the 
scope of my thesis to attempt an evaluation of outcome-related reasons here. But I would 
suggest that it is difficult to see how outcome-related reasons could pose a strong argument 
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for the eminency of courts over legislatures if we agree that also the former are engaged in 
political debates. It is furthermore very difficult to evaluate a counterfactual claim of the kind 
Dworkin makes when he says that, overall, judicial review has made the U.S. a better 
democracy than if a system of judicial review had not existed. Even in the absence of judicial 
review, social and political battles would have existed, and they would have been 
controversial. What the outcome of those struggles would have been if decided by a 
legislature rather than a court is anybody’s guess, and would primarily rely on assumptions 
about a counterfactual past. Waldron also points to the legislative debate about abortion in the 
U.K in 1966 as an example of principled and responsible debate about individual rights. Such 
considerations can serve as a reason to be somewhat more hopeful about the reasoning 
abilities of legislatures. 
 
The conclusion for Waldron is that outcome-related reasons ought to be considered neutral in 
terms of an argument for or against judicial review. Further backing this point for Waldron is 
the fact of reasonable disagreement about rights. In many contemporary democracies, 
difficult and controversial issues of rights are subject to very real disagreements that we 
ought to respect. This respect means giving each citizen a voice and a vote in the decision. 
Putting the final authority of the interpretation of the extent and scope of constitutional rights 
direct electoral control violates this respect. This is essentially Waldron’s process-related 
reason for the lack of democratic legitimacy of strong judicial review, when compared with 
legislatures. 
 
3.7. The Process-Related Argument. 
Waldron’s main argument against judicial review is what he calls process-related. It is an 
argument that, hopefully, is somewhat familiar. He imagines a citizen Cn who is going to be 
bound or burdened by a decision she disagrees with. If Cn will not change her mind, and is 
not unreasonable; how can we answer her when she asks why she ought to accept this 
decision and abide by it? Specifically, Waldron has her asking two questions: 
 
1) Why should this bunch of roughly five hundred men and women (the members of the legislature) be 
privileged to decide a question of rights affecting me and a quarter billion others? 
2) Even if I accept the privileging of this five hundred, why wasn’t greater weight given to the views of 
those legislators who agreed with me?147 
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Waldron’s answer is that the process that arrived at the answer was arrived at fairly. Fairly for 
Waldron meaning that it was a majoritarian decision that gave everyone affected a voice and 
a vote. The first question about why such a small number of people are privileged to make 
decisions that affect everyone is answered by a theory of fair elections in which all citizens 
were treated when deciding who was going to be a member of the legislature. The second 
question is answered by Waldron by citing the majority decision as a fair and equal. He does 
not provide an in-depth argument for the fairness of majority decisions, but says that: 
 
Better than any other rule, MD is neutral as between the contested outcomes, treats participants equally, 
and gives each expressed opinion the greatest weight possible compatible with giving equal weight to 
all opinions. When we disagree about the desired outcome, when we do not want to bias the matter up-
front one way or another, and when each of the relevant participants has a moral claim to be treated as 
an equal in the process, then MD – or something like it – is the principle to use.148 
 
In addition to this basic defence of the majority decision, this reply to Cn also gives reasons 
for why MD is used by the legislature. For Waldron, the general idea is that by having a 
relatively large number of representatives in legislatures, and having them use MD to decide 
matters, legislatures are set up so as to best provide a reasonable approximation of how the 
citizenry at large would have decided issues. The response to Cn is that legislators are elected 
and decide matters in a way that respects the views and voices of all citizens to the greatest 
possible degree: 
 
We give each person the greatest say possible compared with an equal say for the others. That is our 
principle. And we believe that our complicated electoral and representative arrangements roughly 
satisfy the demand for our political equality – that is equal voice and equal decisional authority.149 
 
These answers to the disgruntled citizen are a defence of the legitimacy of the decision and 
the institution that made it. But it is also important to note that Waldron’s view of legitimacy 
here is decidedly procedural. That is, political decisions are given legitimacy, not because of 
the substance of the decision, but because the decision was reached through a fair procedure. 
Waldron wants a procedural defence rather than a substantive defence because of the second 
circumstance of politics. Waldron does not want that the answer to Cn’s questions involve the 
claim that her view is wrong. Instead he sees a good decision-procedure as one that respects 
democracy as self-government; in this way Waldron sees majority rule, tempered by a 
commitment to rights and a democratic culture, as the true mark of democratic legitimacy. 
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But it is at the same time important to remember that it is not Waldron’s argument that this is 
always the case. In cases where a commitment to individual and minority rights are lacking, 
or political institutions are not in “good working order”, he is not committed to insisting that 
decisions made under such circumstances are democratically legitimate, simply because those 
who decided followed an accepted procedure. It is within the core cases Waldron’s four 
assumptions pick out that his argument applies. 
 
This is Waldron’s core argument against judicial review. What is interesting is that while it is 
a familiar argument, in that is very similar to the counter-majoritarian difficulty, it is subject 
to conditions that are quite stringent. While meant to cover many actual democracies, the 
assumptions about core societies are quite demanding and emphasize a political community’s 
commitment to the rights of all citizens as crucial in protecting minority and individual rights. 
Another part of this is that it is not just personal interests or preferences that are counted in 
the majoritarian process. What is counted is the good-faith opinions of its citizens. 
 
In the following chapter I will more closely examine some aspects of Waldron's and 
Dworkin's conceptions. I argue that Dworkin's conception does not sufficiently respect the 
ideal of democracy as self-government. I also believe that Waldron faces challenges in 
meeting this demand. I will point to what I believe are the main problems with Waldron's 
account, and put particular emphasis on doubts about his democratic commitment. As a reply 
to this I also introduce an approach due to Allan C. Hutchinson called strong democracy. 
This conception is similar to Waldron's in its emphasis on citizen's participation in 
government. But Hutchinson uses this to recommend significant and widespread changes in 









Chapter 4: A Basic Tension. 
 
I began this thesis with a question about the democratic legitimacy of judicial review. At the 
outset, this is a question that is quite limited in its scope. It concerns a small part of a much 
larger political framework. But the scope of the debate about judicial review is much broader 
than it may seem at first. That is, the debate about judicial review and its democratic 
legitimacy is intrinsically linked with much broader questions about the proper conception of 
democracy. Arguments for or against judicial review depend on the underlying conceptions 
of democracy and constitutionalism. Thus, what at first seems like a limited question about 
the role of the judiciary in constitutional interpretation and protection of rights, also raises 
questions about democracy itself. 
 
[…] It seems that the crucial fault lines in the debates concerning judicial review run mainly along the 
cleavages between different conceptions of the legitimacy of democracy, of constitutionalism, and of 
their interrelationships. They do not seem to run mainly along the lines – as jurisprudential scholarship 
often assumes – of different conceptions of judicial assertiveness and passivity, or of different methods 
of constitutional and statutory interpretation.150 
 
4.1. Dworkin and Waldron on Democracy. 
In line with this, Dworkin’s and Waldron’s respective positions on the legitimacy of judicial 
review represent different conceptions of democratic legitimacy. But despite their 
differences, I also want to emphasize that there are similar features in Waldron’s and 
Dworkin’s conceptions of democracy. And this is not really so surprising. They are both part 
of a classical liberal tradition that is both very concerned with rights, and the source and 
legitimacy of coercive political power. And they also generally embrace, with the exception 
of judicial review, democratic institutions and practices found in the United States in 
particular.151 They also view political rights as ultimately being moral rights. Thus, the 
question of whether a society upholds and protects rights, and that they do this in the proper 
way is a question of political morality. 
 
Nonetheless their differences are substantial and deep. Fundamentally, Dworkin’s theory 
advances a conception of democracy that is a comprehensive and substantive view of justice. 
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For Dworkin, the true test of democracy lies in the kind of political decisions a society 
makes. Democracy is possible only to the extent that the result of such decisions is to enact 
and uphold the conditions that enable us to view ourselves and our fellow citizens as partners 
engaged in a common enterprise, one that we collectively take responsibility for. This 
enterprise is democratic to the extent it respects Dworkin’s substantive democratic 
conception. 
 
Opposite Dworkin, Waldron centres his conception of democracy on the procedures by which 
political decisions are made, rather than the particular outcome of the procedures. For 
Waldron, the fact that there is reasonable disagreement about what counts as the right or 
wrong decisions means that we ought to seek out a conception of democracy that does not 
attempt to take sides in a controversial debate about what the correct conception of justice is. 
Democracy for Waldron focuses on what he terms the most basic right: the right of 
participation. Following this, the democratic conception is centred on the notion of self-
government. 
 
In the following I want to present what I believe is the main argument against Dworkin’s 
conception of democracy: that it ultimately fails to do justice to the notion of democracy as 
self-government. 
 
I will then move on to Waldron’s conception and point to a tension in his conception of 
democracy connected with the concept of reasonable disagreement and his principle of 
legitimacy. Furthermore, I will question Waldron’s assumption that legislatures can 
effectively and reliably function as a mirror for the deliberative decisions that would take 
place if decisions were undertaken by the demos as a whole. 
 
4.2. Substance and Paternalism. 
Dworkin’s conception of democracy represents an ambitious and impressive project that 
connects politics, ethics, and morality in order to protect and enhance human dignity. His 
definition of democratic legitimacy are those institutional arrangements that best fulfil the 
substantive demands of our rights to dignity. The true test of democracy for him is that our 
equal status as individuals are respected. This is an appealing conception, but its substantive 
nature is also a problem. Primarily because it does not do justice to the deep connection 
between democracy and participation. 
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As a matter of fact, there are, and will be, disagreements about what the conception of justice 
that Dworkin presents actually entails, especially in concrete cases. For Dworkin, this 
disagreement is explained as being a product of different interpretations of abstract values 
and principles. But Dworkin must hold that some interpretations are successful and some are 
not. And the correct view is democratic while the incorrect is not, regardless of what the 
popular majority is. The value that Dworkin places on participation in one’s own government 
is mostly symbolic. The value of free and fair elections is that they confirm our status as 
equal members of a shared community, not that these equal members need to actually have a 
say. In this way, there is in principle nothing wrong with judge Learned Hand described as 
“being ruled by a bevy of platonic guardians”. Provided these platonic guardians uphold the 
true moral principles and are clever enough to not compromise the sense of equality and 
community in the polity. 
 
It is not without reason that this view has a smattering of paternalism. The deeper issue here 
is that it is possible that arguing for a substantivist understanding of democratic legitimacy 
makes popular participation unimportant as a condition for legitimacy. At least when it comes 
to the basic conditions for democracy. Which is to say that the basic constitutional principles 
and rights, does not depend on participation for their legitimacy. Electoral politics is fine for 
policy questions that do not involve basic principles or rights. But when it comes to these 
fundamental issues, it is the Dworkian substantive account that is the standard for legitimacy, 
regardless of what citizen’s themselves might actually think. In the words of Zurn: 
 
Dworkin seems to be saying, in effect, that the people are allowed to be sovereign with respect to 
policy decisions, but when it comes to principles and rights, they must simply submit to the 
paternalistic imposition of the “conditions of democracy” by an unaccountable Hercules. Under this 
division of labor, the moral competence of citizens does not and cannot extend to collective decisions 
concerning the fundamental conditions under which they are going to regulate their lives together.152 
 
It is deeply problematic for Dworkin’s conception of democracy that it does not give enough 
due to the idea of democracy as self-government. The charge of paternalism is one that is 
clearly brought out in Dworkin’s view on judicial review. That the judiciary is likely to better 
protect the conditions for a democratic partnership than would a legislature or other 
institutions depend on two elements: Scepticism toward the ability of electoral politics to 
protect the democratic conditions and optimism toward supreme court justices’ ability to do 
the same. 
                                                 




4.3. Procedure and legitimacy. 
Waldron is very clear that participation matters. The right to participation and self-
government is the basic democratic right. One issue for Waldron, however, is that this 
principle alone appears to capture the reality of our contemporary political institutions and 
our other democratic practices rather poorly. That is, prima facie, Waldron’s preferred form 
of government would not be simply democracy but the democracy of ancient Athens. Where 
all citizens meet regularly to debate and decide the issues that face the community. And all 
decisions are made by a majority vote. Contemporary democracies are a lot more complicated 
than this. The institution of representative government itself, not to mention 
constitutionalism, seems to run counter to this idea of simple majority rule. 
His ultimate justification for such apparent anti-democratic practices are restricted to 
them being a necessary evil. Even if this is a convincing defence, there would still be a 
pressure, given Waldron’s conception, to push and argue for a much more radical change in 
the way our democracies operate, than to simply scrap strong judicial review. But it is unclear 
in Waldron’s writings about democracy if he endorses such radical changes. In fact, he seems 
at the whole rather content with most aspects of the democratic system of the United States 
and comparable nations. This also includes bicameralism, which, in theory and in practice, is 
a feature of the legislature that is meant to restrict or at least slow down the ability of the 
people’s representatives to enact legislation. 
 
A crucial feature of Waldron’s theory is that when there is disagreement among citizens 
about a decision we ought to treat this disagreement as reasonable. Reasonable disagreement 
stretches to basic political principles and values. But the acknowledgment of reasonable 
disagreement is combined with a principle of democratic legitimacy that stands in tension 
with the acknowledgment of reasonable disagreement. 
 
In addition, Waldron is largely preoccupied with formal equality of political power. For him, 
such equality appears to be guaranteed so long as all citizens are able to vote for their 
preferred political representatives at regular intervals. But this view risks missing important 
structural and cultural aspects that also influence and impact the fairness and equality of a 
democratic system. That is, while political office, is formally open to anyone regardless of 
education, class, wealth, race, gender, or sexuality, it is still possible that there are social and 
economic structural inequalities that hinder certain groups access. That the ranks of 
politicians have little connection to, or understanding of the citizens they are meant to 
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represent is a widespread complaint in many democracies. Waldron recognizes this and 
speaks of the importance of democratic culture, but he does not draw these considerations 
into his principle of legitimacy. 
 
Waldron’s emphasis on the right to vote as the feature of a democracy that best encapsulates 
the basic right to participation also seems somewhat paradoxical, considering the difference 
my single vote is likely to make is precisely nil. Waldron believes this is the consequence of 
addressing collective decisions when citizens number in the millions and billions. And the 
diversity of good-faith opinions among these millions and billions gives us good reasons for 
not simply taking sides in a substantive debate, but thinking about how the political decisions 
we must make in the face of disagreement ought to be taken. 
 
4.4. A Tyranny of the Majority? 
To a large degree defenders, of judicial review are worried about the potential for a tyranny of 
the majority, if legislatures are left with the final word on rights. We risk the majority 
disenfranchising a minority, and unjustly depriving them of their rights. This is no idle worry. 
There are plenty of historical examples of this kind of injustice. One is the treatment of 
unwanted groups in Germany before and during World War 2, another is of racism and 
slavery in the United States. 
 
Waldron wants to mitigate this worry. The first question is what tyranny actually is. If we 
define tyranny as what happens when someone is denied rights, then tyranny is a danger in 
any disagreement about rights. The side claiming a right expanded, or new rights, will feel 
that if their view does not go through then tyranny is the result. And in some cases, both sides 
will feel that rights have been denied if their argument does not go through. So tyranny is 
likely to happen if we acknowledge that our democratic institutions, judicial and legislative, 
will sometimes make mistakes. The question Waldron then asks is whether tyranny by a 
majority is any worse than tyranny of other kinds. I think that he’s being somewhat facetious 
in asking the question. But he’s hinting at the idea that we know of many prejudiced 
majorities that actually have deprived minorities of their rights. So, our association of tyranny 
of the majority to very racist and violent societies can make tyranny of the majority seem 
quite bad. But prejudices also affect the judiciary. 
 
Waldron suggests that we ought to distinguish between two kinds of majorities and 
minorities: topical and decisional. A topical minority or majority are the group or groups 
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whose rights are at stake in an issue, while a decisional minority or majority are making the 
decision. According to Waldron, the cases we ought to be most concerned with are situations 
in which the members of the decisional majority are the same as the topical majority, while 
membership of the decisional minority are the same as the members of the topical minority. 
Waldron uses the example of racial injustice to illustrate this: “White legislators (decisional 
majority) vote for white privilege (topical majority); black legislators lose out in the struggle 
for equal rights for blacks. These are cases, I submit, that we should be particularly concerned 
about under the heading of “tyranny of the majority.””.153 Waldron admits that topical 
minority or majority is a loose term, but that this looseness is not a problem. His point is that: 
“[…] not everyone who votes for the losing side in an issue about rights should be regarded 
as a member of the group whose rights have been adversely affected by the decision”.154 
 
The term topical is very loose, and subject to a lot of reasonable disagreement. Even what 
ought to count as a group that deserves rights protections is subject to heated debate. So, as 
an analytical tool for identifying tyranny I’m not sure that topical and decisional minorities 
and majorities are a big help. 
 
But I believe that his larger point is a valid one. In situations where most members of the 
society do not care about minority or individual rights we ought to be worried about tyranny. 
But in situations where this is true, rights violations are likely to be widespread, and to 
assume that the prejudices plaguing the legislature does not plague the judiciary is a large 
assumption to make. It is an assumption that also betrays an overly pessimistic view of 
legislatures and an overly optimistic one of the courts. An aspect of this worry about a 
tyranny of the majority highlights the importance of democratic culture in preventing unjust 
political decisions. 
 
I will now examine the underpinnings of Waldron’s conception of democracy, particularly 
the notion of reasonable disagreement and his principle of legitimacy. 
 
4.5. Reasonable disagreement. 
For Waldron, the circumstances of politics, and especially reasonable disagreement, provides 
a reason for discounting more substantive conceptions of the kind Dworkin advances because 
such a view would necessarily privilege one kind of conception of justice. This is why 
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Waldron believes we must look to procedure rather than outcome if we want to have a 
conception of democracy that can be accepted by all, regardless of the political or moral 
leanings they might otherwise have. 
 
David Estlund’s “Jeremy Waldron on Law and Disagreement”, focused on the concept of 
reasonable disagreement as it was put forth in the book by the same name. According to 
Estlund: 
 
Waldron’s central thesis is that there is no morally available basis for constraining majoritarian 
political procedures by judicial review, or for basing political legitimacy on any tendency of political 
decisions to be good, or just, or true. Majoritarian processes cannot be subordinated to any particular 
account of justice, or rights, or even democracy without enshrining some view that is open to 
reasonable objection.155 
 
And furthermore that: 
 
Waldron’s critique of judicial review rests, in this book, on his more general view that political 
justification cannot go farther than the justification of fair majoritarian procedures incorporating large 
diverse and deliberative bodies of citizens of representatives. Anything more substantive than this fails 
to respect the wide and reasonable disagreement that actually exists among citizens.156 
 
But Estlund believes that this is a view Waldron cannot hold without getting into trouble. At 
its heart, the problem for Waldron is that Waldron’s notion of legitimacy stands in tension 
with his emphasis on reasonable disagreement. At the outset, Waldron’s view as expressed in 
Law and Disagreement is that political decisions are rendered legitimate or authoritative by 
virtue of the procedure that made them. Estlund dubs this claim Fair Proceduralism: 
 
Political decisions can be rendered authoritative on the basis of having been produced by a deliberative 
majoritarian process that is fair to all citizens and points of view.157 
 
Estlund then draws the implication of this claim for the evaluation of legitimacy as being 
what he calls No Reasonable Objection: 
 
Political power is illegitimate unless there is a basis for it that is beyond reasonable objection.158 
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While no reasonable objection is very demanding of what is to count as legitimate political 
power, it poses a special problem for Waldron because of the importance he puts on 
reasonable disagreement. On Estlund’s explication he formulates this as Deep Disagreement: 
 
No position about what is required by fairness or justice or legitimacy is beyond reasonable doubt.159 
 
The consequence of deep disagreement and No Reasonable objection taken together is, of 
course, that no exercise of political power is ever legitimate. Also known as philosophical 
anarchism.160 It is important to note that while Waldron does not explicitly endorse no 
reasonable objection as a test for political legitimacy in Law and Disagreement. Estlund’s 
claim is that Waldron nonetheless does argue from the principle.161 If Waldron accepts this 
principle he is in trouble, because philosophical anarchism contradicts any conception of 
political legitimacy, including the one expressed in the Fair Proceduralism principle. That is, 
Either Waldron must hold that political decisions can never be legitimate, or he can reject the 
formulation of deep disagreement. Estlund suggest that the best strategy for Waldron is to 
modify deep disagreement in such a way that it does not extend to a principle like Fair 
Proceduralism. 
 
The simplest reply to this difficulty would be to say that on the basic principle of legitimacy 
(fair proceduralism) is beyond reasonable disagreement. Estlund speculates that the reason 
for Waldron’s resistance to this is that if matters of legitimate democratic procedures are 
beyond reasonable disagreement, then this would open the door to the notion that some 
epistemic elite could legitimately trump the disagreement found among citizens.162 That is, it 
would undermine Waldron’s case against judicial review. Estlund, for his part, argues that 
this is not necessarily the case: 
 
The existence of a court with powers to review pertinent legislation may be subject to reasonable 
objections on other grounds. For example, there may be reasonable doubts whether such a court is 
likely to better ascertain and implement the proper standard than a majoritarian procedure. So, the slope 
is not so slippery as Waldron may fear from holding that a conception of democratic legitimacy is 
beyond reasonable objection to holding that some court must be superior to the legislature.163 
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In Law and Disagreement Waldron uses reasonable disagreement, also concerning basic 
political principles, as a way of highlighting a tendency in political discourse of discounting 
the views of conscientious citizens as not just mistaken, but as a result of bad faith or some 
defect of thinking and reasoning. And there is good reason to be hesitant in describing our 
fellow citizens as somehow pathologically mistaken when they disagree with us. But in 
making reasonable disagreement so deep he effectively undermines his own conception of the 
legitimacy of majoritarian processes. 
 
In examining the argument Waldron makes against judicial review in “The Core of the Case 
Against Judicial Review”, it appears that he has taken Estlund’s advice of modifying the 
assumption of reasonable disagreement. But there are still issues for Waldron’s conception, 
even if philosophical anarchism is avoided. 
 
4.6. Fair proceduralism and “The Core of the Case”. 
Estlund’s suggestion is that Waldron can resist the slippery slide toward accepting judicial 
review because there can be “reasonable doubt” as to whether courts are actually better at 
getting issues of rights correctly. In other words, he believes that uncertainty about outcome-
related reasons can provide a basis for opposing judicial review. 
 
In “The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review”, Waldron argues against the idea that 
courts are better than legislatures at getting rights correctly, and he believes we ought to 
regard outcome-related reasons as neutral on the issue. He then develops his procedure-
related argument that tips the balance of argument against judicial review. The centrepiece of 
his argument against judicial review is his process-related argument that proceeds from an 
assumption very much like fair proceduralism. This is clear in “The Core of the Case Against 
Judicial Review”, where the central question of legitimacy is framed as how we justify a 
political decision to a citizen who disagrees with it. Specifically, the question of legitimacy 
must answer two questions from the disgruntled citizens: 
 
1) Why were these people empowered to make the decision (i.e. members of a legislature or 






2) Why wasn’t greater weight given to the views of those who agreed with the disgruntled 
citizen.164 
 
The answer to the first is that in the case of legislators they were elected by a fair process, 
meaning one that treated all citizens equally. And the answer to the second is that all views 
were given equal maximal weight.165 The basic idea at work, then, is that Fair Proceduralism 
provides a principle of legitimacy that even citizens who disagree with a given decision can, 
and ought to, accept. Or in Estlund’s words: “Fair proceduralism says that a law is legitimate 
when it has been produced by a fair process that is fair to all citizens”.166 
 
Reasonable disagreement about rights is also important for Waldron’s core case against 
judicial review, but deep disagreement does not appear to be part of his argument. 
 
Disagreement about rights is his fourth assumption about core societies, but it is not clear 
how deep Waldron takes this disagreement to reach. On the other hand, his third assumption 
is that most members of a society has a general commitment to rights: 
 
Although they believe in the pursuit of the general good under some broad utilitarian conception, and 
although they believe in majority rule as a rough general principle for politics, they accept that 
individuals have certain interests and are entitled to certain liberties that should not be denied simply 
because it would be more convenient for most people to deny them.167 
 
I believe that Estlund’s recommended strategy is the one that Waldron has taken in core of 
the case. He has given up deep disagreement in favour of a modified version where the 
principle of legitimacy is not itself subject to disagreement. He then argues that there is 
sufficient doubt about the superior ability of the judiciary to reach correct decisions about 
rights so that we ought to regard outcome related reasons as neutral on the issue. His 
procedural argument is then meant to carry the day. 
 
But even if this strategy does manage to avoid philosophical anarchism, there are still 
problems for Waldron’s core argument. These are of two kinds. The first has to do with fair 
proceduralism and Waldron’s implication that this principle from fairness uniquely picks out 
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majoritarian decision procedures. The second address Waldron’s assumption that legislatures 
actually fulfil his own conditions of fairness. 
 
4.7. The Majority Decision and fairness. 
Waldron does not argue explicitly for the fairness of the majority decision (MD), but says 
that: “Better than any other rule, MD is neutral as between the contested outcomes, treats 
participants equally, and gives each expressed opinion the greatest weight possible 
compatible with giving equal weight to all opinions”. One way to see this is that his 
procedural case rests on the notion of legitimacy as fairness. MD is the recommended 
strategy that maximally fulfils fairness. This account of fairness has two aspects: 1) Fairness 
requires that all citizens get an equal opportunity to participate in a political decision; and: 2) 
Fairness requires that each citizen’s views are given the greatest weight, compatible with an 
equal weight for the views of all others.168 
 
This is a procedural argument that is meant to recommend a majoritarian decision-procedure 
as best fulfilling fairness in both aspects. A crucial feature of this is that fairness aspect (2) is 
rooted in the idea of reasonable disagreement. It is not fair to privilege some views over 
others, because we do not have access to any independent criteria to base such a privileging 
on. But this presupposes deep disagreement, which is the rejection of the existence of any 
such criteria. The reason that this poses a problem for Waldron’s account, is the fact that 
fairness aspect 1) does not uniquely pick out majoritarian decision procedures as the fairest 
one. A coin-flip for instance, is neutral between outcomes and treats participants equally if 
we are faced with a binary choice. 
 
But even if we accept fairness aspect (2), Waldron’s proposed test would not uniquely 
recommend majoritarian decision-procedures. To this David Estlund has replied that: 
 
First, it remains unclear why this is a value. It is not explained by procedural fairness […]. It is not 
explained by the value of equal respect for persons, since a coin flip or a lottery show no failure of 
equal respect. If maximizing equal decisiveness is an important value, Waldron needs to say why it is, 
since it would be the only reason he gives for preferring majority rule to a lottery or a coin flip. Second, 
even if maximizing equal chance of decisiveness singles out majority rule it also militates in favour of 
very small legislative bodies. The chance of an individual’s being decisive goes down with the size of 
the assembly”.169 
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To the latter objection that fairness aspect (2) would be in favour of small legislative bodies, I 
believe that Waldron could reply that he is not interested in increasing the maximal 
decisiveness of the political representatives of a legislature. But rather we are interested in the 
maximal decisiveness of all citizens. For Waldron, a very small legislature would be less 
likely to represent the diverse opinions extant in the electorate. But there is another problem 
for Waldron, namely that real worries can be raised about the true representative nature of a 
legislature. 
 
4.8. Legislatures as a mirror for the demos. 
The main focus here is Waldron’s treatment of the representative nature of legislatures. His 
view of them is that they represent an approximation of how the citizenry as a whole would 
decide issues: 
 
For legislatures, we use a version of MD [majority decision] to choose representatives and we use a 
version of MD for decision making among representatives. The theory is that together these provide a 
reasonable approximation of the use of MD as a decision-procedure among the citizenry as a whole 
(and so a reasonable approximation of the application of the values underlying MD to the citizenry as a 
whole).170 
 
The reason that legislatures can vindicate the democratic demand of participation is that they 
properly mirror the deliberations and decisions that would take place if the decision was 
actually made by the demos as a whole. This is part of Waldron’s stated intention to provide a 
‘rosy’ picture of legislatures to complement what he views as a widespread idealization of 
courts in much political philosophy. This does, however, present a new challenge to 
Waldron’s argument against judicial review. Representative government, in itself, is counter-
majoritarian if compared with a system of direct democracy where most decisions are made 
by a vote in which all citizens can participate. Waldron argues that this is a necessary 
consequence of living within complicated, large, and diverse, contemporary democracies. 
 
But serious questions can be raised about the representative nature of legislatures. For one, 
professional politicians in most countries tend be quite privileged both in terms of economic 
resources and education. But even excluding this, there are reasonable worries to be had 
about the ability of politicians to subvert the representative nature of legislatures. And 
judicial review might be justified because it guards against this kind of subversion. 
                                                 




This is a strain of arguments for judicial review that Waldron does not address. One of these 
is Fallon’s argument in “An Uneasy Case for Judicial Review”, he suggests that instead of 
viewing judicial review as an either-or between legislative control or judicial control, it 
should instead be regarded as an additional veto point for especially important issues. For 
instance, questions of individual rights. 
 
4.9. Judicial Review and Multiple Veto points. 
In response to Waldron, Richard H. Fallon jr. argues that even assuming that courts are no 
better at getting to the truth about rights, there is an outcome-related case to be made in 
favour of judicial review. Fallon suggests that it can be legitimate because it represent an 
extra protection of rights that a society deems particularly important. “If errors of 
underprotection – that is, infringements of rights – are more morally serious than errors of 
overprotection […] there could be outcome related reasons to prefer a system with judicial 
review to one without it”.171 Fallon uses the analogy of the jury system in the U.S. as an 
example. The U.S. jury system requires unanimity from the jurors in order to convict 
someone for a crime. This is because it would be morally worse to send an innocent person to 
jail than it would be to let a guilty person go free. 
 
 
Fallon suggests that outcome related reasons could also be the value of a additional veto point 
for important decisions: “[…] Might a society reasonable want to create multiple veto points 
so that governmental action could not occur if either a court or the legislature thought that the 
action would violate individual rights?”172 
 
4.10. Embracing deep disagreement? 
Estlund recommends that Waldron modify the assumption of deep disagreement because it 
threatens to undermine his principle of legitimacy that recommends MD as a maximally 
democratic decision procedure. This undermines his process-related case and results in 
outcome-related reasons being more important, a case Waldron himself rules as inconclusive. 
Furthermore, there are also issues concerned with his recommendation that a majority 
decision uniquely satisfy his demands to fairness. 
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Allan C. Hutchinson has suggested a case against judicial review that is based on the 
rejection that outcome related reasons ought to be relevant for the debate about judicial 
review at all. Fundamentally Hutchinson believes that Waldron’s assumption that there is 
truth about rights is mistaken. For instance, the latter argues that courts are not better at 
getting at the truth about rights than are legislatures. Contrary to this Hutchinson argues that 
there is no such truth to be had. 
 
In terms of a conception of democracy he rejects the notion that democracy means fulfilling 
some set of objective values or truths. In other words, he rejects the idea that there is, even in 
principle, some set of rights that “will always be morally superior”.173 Instead “it is for people 
to determine themselves what is best for them”.174 What this means is that the standard for 
what is just or unjust is process by which a decision is made: 
 
The lack of any neutral, reliable, or uncontested epistemic procedure by which to resolve 
disagreements means that there is no way to compare the effectiveness of different institutions in terms 
of their capacity for determining better or worse outcomes. Indeed, without such a method, the only 
way to compare and contrast different institutions for resolving rights disputes is by their process-
related qualities and strengths.175 
 
What Hutchinson is arguing for is a conception of democracy that views it as a social practice 
rather than as a set of principles or values. 
 
Against this charge of relativism Hutchinson argues that the starting point ought to be already 
existing democratic practices and institutions. Arguments from fairness and emphasis on 
participation are here not grounded in anything beyond “communal practices and 
engagement”.176 
This, of course, opens up both a charge of relativism and a charge of a tyranny of the 
majority. That is, if there is no independent standard, or no right or wrong answer to 
questions of rights that face a polity, how can we criticize those decisions if we find them 
unjust? With the danger of proving that Godwin’s law also applies to philosophy: If a society 
had a majority that was thoroughly Nazified, in addition to being democratic in the sense that 
it truly allowed for the participation of all citizens in political decisions, would not the 
interment of undesirables (at the very least) be democratic in Hutchinson’s conception? 
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This charge of relativism has long been an issue in moral and political philosophy. The 
absence of a standard of legitimacy that is independent of the values and principles held in 
the societies in question implies that whatever a society holds to be legitimate is legitimate. 
Hutchinson believes that he can resist this charge because his view is not that “all views on 
all topics are as good or valid as any other”.177 His position is, instead, that the standard for 
our moral values is whatever values “pass muster under the prevailing democratic procedures 
and protocols of justification”.178 In the specific realm of politics this means that: “Political 
and moral rights are justified to the extent that a vibrant democracy holds faith with them”.179 
This is more or less what Hutchinson has to say on the subject of relativism. 
 
But this is not necessarily as radically relativist as it may at first seem. The democratic ideal 
that Hutchinson draws on to formulate his conception of strong democracy is an ideal that is 
taken from the existing political culture and tradition in contemporary democracies, and not 
grounded in some independent principle beyond our current political discourse. 
 
Burton Dreben has argued that John Rawls, one of the giants in political philosophy, 
advocates for a similar position. Much debate about Rawls has centred around his theory as a 
theory of rational decision theory. Dreben argues that while this may be the case in Justice as 
Fairness, Rawls revises his position in the later Political Liberalism.180 According to Dreben, 
Rawls’ project is to start with “[…] intuitive moral, political considerations, and then you see 
what they come to. You cannot ground them.”181 Specifically, Rawls has engaged in an 
attempt to work out if the notion of a constitutional liberal democracy is internally consistent 
or not. The strategy is not to ground the pre-eminence of constitutional liberal democracies 
over all other forms of government in some abstract and neutral principle. Rather, Rawls 
proceeds from the assumption that constitutional liberal democracy is what we have. And, 
furthermore, that the institutions and political life of a society express and embody ideas and 
principles that are shared. Rawls says that: 
 
In a democratic society [and always you must read that as constitutional liberal democratic society] 
there is a tradition of democratic thought, the content of which is at least familiar and intelligible to the 
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educated common sense of citizens generally. Society’s main institutions, and their accepted forms of 
interpretation, are seen as a fund of implicitly shared ideas and principles.182 
 
This fund is the starting point for Rawls’ theory. The point is not to ground it in a 
transcendent principle, nor even argue for why this fund ought to be our starting point. The 
point is to see where it leads.183 I will not go further in the examination of Rawls’ conception 
of liberal constitutional democracy here. But I hope that these brief considerations present a 
possibility that taking as a starting point existing ideals and values, for instance, the notion of 
democracy as popular government, does not lead us to a position where we are forced to 
admit that no conception is better or worse than any other. The question is what more detailed 
conceptions we can work out on the basis of our shared fund of ideas. 
 
4.11. Strong Democracy. 
Hutchinson shares Waldron’s commitment to popular participation in government. But he 
views the extent of these commitments to be much more far ranging and demanding than 
Waldron. According to Hutchinson: “Strong democrats will look to extend and proliferate the 
opportunities for participation in micro-communities rather than to narrow and accrete 
decision-making power to small and centralised elites in the name of expertise and truth”.184 
 
In other words, Hutchinson wants to see an ambitious transformation of democratic 
institutions and structures. This includes the legislature that Waldron believes is so well 
situated as an instrument of popular participation. Hutchinson says that: 
 
Rather than function as remote entities that have tenuous claim to democratic legitimacy through 
occasional elections, they might begin to be less entrenched and more responsive in their designs, 
deliberations, and decisions; local government would replace federal government at the heart of 
democratic involvement.185 
 
Hutchinson’s claim is that if there is to be an institution or institutions that is meant to 
help protect the rights of citizens, such institutions must themselves be more representative 
and accountable to popular views.186 Judicial review does not meet this criterion. 
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In this way, Hutchinson sides with Waldron in the debate about judicial review but resists 
viewing the debate as a zero-sum choice between legislatures and courts.187 
 
This notion of strong democracy also has wide-reaching consequences for the way in which 
we view constitutionalism. For instance, Hutchinson recommends an idea expressed by the 
United States founding father Thomas Jefferson: that every generation ought to have the 
ability to choose the constitution it wanted.188 This and similar measures suggested by 
Hutchinson and Colón-Ríos aim to bring the constitution more clearly under democratic 
control. It is a clear break with a constitutionalist conception that emphasizes the stability of a 
constitution over the possibilities for actual citizens to change the constitution. 
 
I will continue by reviewing the tension between democracy and constitutionalism, and 
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Chapter 5: A Democratic Constitution? 
 
5.1. Democracy or Constitution? 
Running through this thesis is a basic tension. This is the tension between democracy and 
constitution. One source of this tension is that they represent two different principles of 
legitimacy. Understanding democracy as participation in government means tying the basic 
principles of legitimacy to a procedural ideal. Namely that the people decide for themselves 
as equals. Per this principle then, there ought to be no constraints on what the people can and 
cannot decide to do. But at the same time, the former represents principles of legitimacy that 
are tied to an ideal about outcomes. That is, per this principle there are constraints. The 
debate about judicial review brings out this tension more clearly because strong judicial 
review, gives the judiciary the authority to overrule legislation if they believe it contradicts 
the constitution. The common way of formulating the problem as having to do with the 
democratic legitimacy of judicial review, highlights this further. If constitution and 
democracy represent two different principles of legitimacy: one concerned with substantive 
outcomes, and the other concerned with procedures, then it seems as if we must make a 
choice between them. 
 
I believe that the tension between constitutionalism and democracy is also connected with 
modern notions of plurality. To say that ‘the people’ are to create their own constitution, what 
this ‘people’ actually refers to is a dilemma as well. Is it the actual people living in Norway 
here and now, or something more hypothetical and abstract? Increasingly we have become 
sceptical towards appeals to a hypothetical and unified people. In terms of principles of 
legitimacy, this is a reason to shift the focus from outcome to procedure.189 We cannot expect 
people to agree on substance, but maybe they can agree on procedure. At the same time, there 
is a great deal of disagreement on what is to count as fair, just, and democratic procedures as 
well. For one thing, differences in procedure can easily lead to differences in outcome. In 
practice, support or opposition to judicial review tends to shift depending on what we think 
about certain cases.190 This will be the case even with a truly democratic procedure of 
constitutional enactment. 
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Constitutions provide a stable framework for ordinary electoral politics. It is therefore 
unappealing to say that we ought to do away with constitutional law as such in favour of 
parliamentary supremacy. 
 
Dworkin places himself quite firmly on the side of constitutions. While there is a place for 
participation, the basic principle of legitimacy is tied to a substantive ideal about outcomes. 
Dworkin wants a constitutional democracy where basic political principles and values are 
enshrined in a constitution and protected by the judiciary. Popular control does not, in the 
main, extend to constitutional essentials. Dworkin’s support for strong judicial review also 
means that final authority on constitutional interpretation lies beyond electoral or 
participatory control. There is a place for democracy here, but it does not extend very far. 
 
On the other side of the tension, Waldron clearly identifies democracy with a right to 
participation and argues that final authority on constitutional interpretation ought to be in the 
legislature rather than the court. Waldron’s approach favours the democratic side of the 
tension, advocating giving greater authority to legislatures. He draws out the right to 
participation as the democratic right. From this rights-based standpoint, Waldron advocates 
for a procedural principle of fairness as the source of democratic legitimacy. 
 
I have argued that Waldron ends up in trouble, in large part because he does not seem to 
endorse the comprehensive consequences of his account of democratic legitimacy. By 
comparison, Hutchinson’s notion of strong democracy does not suffer from this defect. 
 
In a strong democracy, it is a point of principle and practice that ends and means are integrated as 
closely as practically possible: The status and legitimacy of the initiating procedures is the benchmark 
against which both the legal system and any particular enactment’s legitimacy can be measured. The 
greater the extent and quality of participation in the legislative and adjudicative process, the greater the 
legitimacy of their substantive pronouncements.191 
 
Based on a procedural ideal of equal participation, this ideal also leads him to highlight 
substantive demands like economic equality.192 This and many other features of society are 
important for citizen’s ability to actually participate in society on a broader scale than today. 
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These are features that Waldron speaks highly of as part of a democratic culture, but he does 
not include them as part of his conception of democratic legitimacy. 
 
Hutchinson’s approach is also one that clearly subjugate constitutional protections to 
democratic control. In his own words, strong democracy represents a wager that giving more 
power to citizens will result in better outcomes: “Its critical wager is that the governed will 
produce more outcomes which are more conducive to society as a whole than those dictated 
by abstract and partial principles or by elite institutions or agencies”.193 Strong democracy in 
this way gives up the notion that we can guard against rights violations and unjust political 
decisions at the level of philosophical theory. “With democracy comes risk. But that is both 
the exhilarating promise and the ever present danger of democratic governance”.194 
 
I do not believe I am alone if feeling that there is something unsatisfactory about simply 
hoping that increased participation will lead to better outcomes. It appears that the best 
Hutchinson can do to reassure those who are worried about rights violations or a more 
general tyranny of the majority, is to say that you will simply have to engage in the political 
fights in your society and do your best to make sure your side wins. While it certainly is an 
exciting gamble with high stakes, it is not very reassuring for those who are less confident in 
the potential results of choosing democracy over constitutional protections. 
 
5.2. Ordinary Politics and Constitutional Politics. 
Above I stated the tension between constitution and democracy as one between two 
competing principles of legitimacy. Either procedure or outcome. This way of formulating 
suggests that we have to choose one or the other. I want to argue that this is not necessary. A 
different way of formulating the tension can be found in Bruce Ackerman. He distinguished 
normal politics from constitutional politics. The latter were periods of “heightened political 
consciousness”, where ‘the people’ speak outside of the ordinary institutions of government 
like the legislature.195 Simone Chambers writes that: “[…] There are special moments in the 
life of a political community where deep, ‘constitutive’ issues gain visibility in the public 
sphere and lead to a reflexive evaluation of a constitutional tradition or dilemma”.196 By 
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contrast, normal politics are periods where it is the government that speaks and we should not 
automatically interpret the actions of government as the true expressions of ‘the people’. 
 
By using this distinction between normal politics and constitutional politics, we can 
recognize the tension between constitution and democracy without having to that tension go 
away. In normal politics, we can more readily accept the need for a representative 
government that deals with the day-to-day work of politics. It would be cumbersome, to say 
the least, to run a society by continual referenda or citizen’s assemblies. But because 
constitutional politics is both more fundamental and intermittent, we can design institutions 
and processes that draws more on actual participation from actual citizens. A truly democratic 
enactment of a constitutional order would not eliminate the tension between constitutionalism 
and democracy. But bringing the constitution more clearly under democratic control could 
bring us closer to the ideal of popular sovereignty, also at the basic level of constitutional 
law. 
 
5.3. The case of Norway. 
With this latter point in mind, Norway, despite its system of strong judicial review, might not 
be in such a bad way in terms of the democratic credentials of its constitution. Recall that the 
Norwegian constitution was extensively revised as recently as in 2014. Fittingly enough, the 
revision was particularly significant because it extended individual rights protections and 
officially recognized judicial review. Changes to the Norwegian constitution requires a 
supermajority in the legislature to change the constitution. Specifically, suggestions for 
constitutional changes must be put forth within the three first years of a legislative session. 
The suggested changes are then evaluated, debated and subject to a vote after the subsequent 
election. The point being that the electorate can review suggested changes before an election, 
and use their vote in the subsequent election to have their say about whether or not they 
approve of those changes. 
 
In theory, this arguably puts the Norwegian constitution on a fairly solid democratic footing. 
While not subject to a referenda or other forms of direct electoral input, the possibility of 
engaging with the significant changes of the constitution was there. However, Inge Lønning, 
the leader of the body charged with proposing the constitutional changes, said that the public 
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debate about the changes was lacking.197  Legal scholar Anine Kierulf also criticized the 
revision of the constitution, not because of its content, but because of a lack of citizen’s 
participation. The formal procedures were followed, but Kierulf argued that both the 
legislative debate, and the broader public debate about the significant changes proposed was 
lacking, and that this compromised the democratic legitimacy of the changes.198 
At the face of it, that strong judicial review was enacted so recently would make it the 
people’s preferred option for evaluating the constitutionality of legislation. The significant 
revision of the Norwegian constitution in 2014 to not only include judicial review in the 
constitution, but also expanding rights protections, can then be viewed as re-affirming the 
constitution as the preferred framework of the people themselves. To the extent that the 
constitution has democratic legitimacy as a whole, the system of judicial review also has 
democratic legitimacy. The Norwegian courts are protecting the political structures, 
procedures, and individual rights that the Norwegian people themselves enacted. 
 
5.4. Justification, Application and Judicial Review. 
Making the constitution regularly subject to a referendum, would seem likely to increase the 
likelihood that the debate is of a better quality the next time we change the constitution. But 
even if the debate about the 2014 revision of the constitution were of a good quality so that 
we could say that its democratic legitimacy had been clearly established, there is another 
problem. And this is directly related to judicial review and a disanalogy between ordinary 
jurisprudence and constitutional review. 
In ordinary criminal law, it is the job of the court to examine a particular case and determine 
which law (if any) best applies to that particular case. The laws themselves are not up for 
examination. For instance, if someone if accused of stealing bread, that they did so too feed 
their starving family, does not impact the court’s decision on their guilt.199 Viewed in this 
way, courts are not engaged in justifying legal norms, they are simply applying already 
established norms. Constitutional review as such (not just judicial review) is then not a matter 
of upholding or implementing some substantive set of values or norms, but simply the 
application of constitutional norms to concrete cases. Provided these norms were the outcome 
                                                 
197 Lunde, «ingen bryr seg om grunnloven», i Aftenposten 6/8-2012. URL:  
https://www.aftenposten.no/norge/i/4qrgq/Ingen-bryr-seg-om-Grunnloven. 
198 Kierulf, “Konstitusjonalisme på norsk”, I Klassekampen 25/4-2014. URL: 
http://klassekampen.no/article/20140425/ARTICLE/140429962, 27/08-2017. 
199 Though it may be a reason for leniency in sentencing. 
85 
 
of a fair and democratic process, the democratic worry about judicial review is not so 
pressing. 
 
This is part of Jürgen Habermas’ defence of judicial review.200  He drew a distinction 
between application and justification discourses in his defence of judicial review. But while 
the distinction may be useful as an analytical tool, it is not so easy to maintain in practice. 
The justification and application of norms stand in a reflexive relationship, and ultimately 
refer back to each other. According to Zurn: 
 
[…] We could only accept the validity of a general norm in a justification discourse in the light of some 
expectations about how it will work in practice, that is, about how it will concretely affect various 
persons and their interests. Justification discourses then, inevitably refer back to application discourses. 
Likewise, as general norms are only provisionally justified in the absence of sufficiently countervailing 
reasons, new concrete fact situations can arise that cause us to call into question the prima facie 
justification of a general norm, thereby making the previously unproblematic general norm, thereby 
making the previously unproblematic general norm presumptively unjustified.201 
 
The point I want to draw out from this is that constitutional review cannot be clearly 
delineated from the process of constitution writing. This means that it is not a sufficient 
defence for judicial review to argue that it is simply engaged in protecting an already enacted 
constitution. But by the same token, ordinary jurisprudence is not a clear-cut case of 
application discourse either. While a court case may end with the application of a general 
norm on a concrete case, part of the work of the court can also include dealing with the 
relationship between potentially competing legal rules, and the relationship between them.202 
 
The greater problem for giving power of constitutional review to courts is connected to other 
features that make the analogy between ordinary law and constitutional law problematic. 
In the case of ordinary law, what happens when there is uncertainty about how a law ought to 
be interpreted, or how two different laws relate to each other? A natural answer is that the 
issue ought to be clarified by those who made the laws, namely the legislature. But in the 
case of constitutional law neither courts nor legislatures have the proper authority to make 
                                                 
200 That judicial review is an application discourse is part of Jürgen Habermas’ defence of judicial review. See 
for instance Zurn (2009) 243-252 for more on his defence in particular. 
201 Zurn, Deliberative Democracy and the Institutions of Judicial Review (2009), 257. 
202 Ibid., 247-248. 
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constitutions. On the framework I have developed here, that power resides, in principle, 
solely with ‘the people’ themselves. 
 
To begin with, remember that, when discussing constitutional interpretation, Dworkin takes 
as his starting point that it is unclear what the values embedded in a constitution actually 
entails. For him this is connected with the semantic nature of constitutions. Much of the 
language in constitutions is abstract, and refers to abstract values and principles whose 
interpretation and specification is not uncontroversial. Zurn says that this feature of 
constitutions can reasonably be seen as a consequence of reaching agreement on 
constitutional provisions under conditions of unavoidable and reasonable disagreement. Even 
if there is disagreement about the reasons for endorsing a specific textual formulation, a 
minimal disagreement can more easily be reached. It is furthermore possible to reach 
agreement on a specific text, without there being agreement on how that text is to be applied 
to particular cases.203 Zurn’s formulation is that constitutional protection inevitably will 
transmute into constitutional elaboration.204 
 
This is why there is also a need to consider the democratic credentials of the institutions that 
are charged with the interpretation and elaboration of constitutional law. A further difference 
between ordinary jurisprudence and constitutional jurisprudence arise because neither courts 
nor legislatures truly have legitimate constitution making power. That power is meant to 
reside with ‘the people’ themselves, represented by a constitutional assembly. 
 
Another way of seeing the danger here is that in applying constitutional tests to statutes and policies, a 
constitutional court may engage in forms of constitutional specification that rely on reasons available 
legitimately only to democratic processes of self-government, and thereby surrender a court’s ordinary 
claim to legitimacy based on its narrow specialization in legal discourse.205 
 
That is, the courts cannot legitimately produce, or even change those norms. That authority 
rests only with the legislature as representatives of the constitution forming power of the 
people themselves. But it is a feature of constitutions, and, in particular, rights protections, 
that they must be elaborated and specified. This means that, in fact, the courts charged with 
                                                 
203 Ibid., 258-259. 
204 Ibid., 257. 
205 Ibid., 249. 
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constitutional review will be engaged in more than simply applying established norms.206 So 
even if we were content with the democratic credentials of the constitution, there remains a 
problem of democratic legitimacy attached to the system of strong judicial review. 
 
5.5. An unjust constitution? 
I now want to attempt to draw out the tension between constitution and democracy by virtue 
of a hypothetical example. Suppose that Norway first enacts measures to bring the 
constitution more clearly under democratic control in line with the suggestions from 
Hutchinson. Furthermore, assume that process and the public debate surrounding it is 
extensive and of high quality. What if the outcome of this process is that the new constitution 
violates fundamental rights? Say, for instance, Norwegian citizens decide that the threat of 
terrorism means that we must surrender our right to privacy, and allow for widespread 
surveillance of all citizens, without a demand for a reasonable cause for such surveillance. 
After all, if you have done nothing wrong, you have nothing to fear, or so the argument goes. 
 
Thinkers in the classical liberal tradition, like Dworkin, can use their substantive conception 
of democracy to argue that such constitutional provisions are democratically illegitimate. On 
this view a right to privacy is a necessary condition for democracy proper. Employing a 
procedural ideal like the strong democratic one I have recommended here does not allow for 
this rejoinder. This does not mean that there is nothing for the strong democrat to object to.  
But the objection must be grounded in the democratic ideal as it is embedded in Norwegian 
society today. On this view, there is nothing that prima facie, disqualifies restricting a right to 
privacy in a democratic society. This is not to say that rights are not important, nor that there 
are not better or worse outcomes. Instead the source of these rights is the actual commitment 
a society have to them. Hutchison’s contention is that: “Political and moral rights exist and 
are justified to the extent that a vibrant democracy holds faith in them”.207 In the hypothetical 
case here, Norway has decided to not hold faith in the right to privacy. Is the strong democrat 
then committed to defending this decision as democratically legitimate on grounds of 
procedural legitimacy? I believe the answer to this is yes. In other words, we ought to bite the 
bullet, as it were. In my hypothetical case, it is perfectly legitimate to restrict the right to 
privacy. But it is important to see that any such decision is part of an ongoing democratic 
                                                 
206 Recall that it is also a key component of Dworkin’s conception that constitutional interpretation is a 
productive endeavour that requires the use of the moral and political judgement of judges. 
207 Huthcinson, “A ‘Hard Core’ Case against judicial review” (2008), 61. 
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process, where values, principles, rights, and their moral and political status are under 
continual development and debate. 
 
But perhaps this example does not go far enough. After all, democratic political participation 
can still be widespread even though the government can legally read your emails. 
Surveillance has been expanded in many democracies, and while problematic they are 
generally still recognized as democracies. So, what if a democratically revised Norwegian 
constitution only allow property owning men over 25 years of age the vote? As in the case of 
a right to privacy there is nothing outside this democratic process that can delegitimate such a 
decision by virtue of its outcome. By virtue of a procedural ideal this decision in itself would 
be democratically legitimate. But in this case, any subsequent political decision based on this 
would not be legitimate. I would argue that it would, in fact, cease to be a democracy 
altogether. Universal adult suffrage is a cornerstone of democratic government. 
 
Referring back to the idea that Norwegian citizens to a large extent share a fund of values and 
principles embodied in our laws and political traditions, the essential move is to move away 
from the notion that the constitution ought to be as rigid as possible, and to embrace the 
possibility of constitutional change rather than fear it. The democratic and political culture of 
Norway, or any political culture, contains a fund of values and principles that does hold a 




Whether as an initiating procedure to call a constitutional assembly or as a ratification of 
proposed constitutional changes, referendums are an important part of democratizing 
constitutional politics. But this does not mean that such referenda in themselves are a 
democratic panacea. Both Napoleon and Hitler used referendums to confirm their status as 
supreme leader of France and Germany respectively. There are a number of ways that 
government executives can use referendums in ways that run counter to democratic ideals. 
First, referendums ask citizens a yes or no question that they cannot revise. It does not allow 
citizens to question or deliberate about the questions asked. Second is the question about 
voter competence. For instance, if the suggested changes to a constitution are many and 
complicated, votes may be cast for woefully insufficient reasons. Third, referendums are 
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susceptible to manipulations from executives, media institutions and other individuals or 
groups. 
 
Further problems arise if we consider that a referendum may pass, but turnout can be low.208 
As such it can be unclear what the result of a referendum actually mean. In short, 
referendums cannot alone guarantee a good democratic process. In particular, they do not 
necessarily reflect the kind of expansive and high quality good faith debate we want. It is 
interesting to note that many of the reasons for being sceptical towards referendums can, and 
are, also used to express doubts about ordinary elections as well. But in constitutional 
referendums the stakes are even higher. 
 
The dilemma is that voting and referendums are the obvious choice if we want citizens to 
have their say. But at the same time, we need to be attentive to the dangers of using 
referendums. There is also the argument that engaging the citizenry in a referendum can help 
to improve and increase both participation and deliberation. This does not happen 
automatically, however. We should be attentive to both formal and informal procedures and 
institutions that are involved in constitutional referendums, and how they can influence 
public debate and the degree to which people feel that their arguments have been given a fair 
hearing. Talking about majority rule, John Dewey said that : 
 
Majority rule, just as majority rule, is as foolish as its critics charge it with being. But it is never merely 
majority rule. […] The means by which a majority comes to be a majority is the important thing: 
antecedent debates, the modification of views to meet the opinions of minorities. […] The essential 
need, in other words is the improvement of the methods and conditions of debate, discussion and 
persuasion”.209 
 
Majority rule by virtue of constitutional referendum carries with it the same aspiration. 
Organising town hall meetings, creating forums where interested citizens can meet and 
debate the issues at hand, as well as procedures for collating and  collecting the views and 
arguments expressed by the citizenry can help to increase what Dewey called “the methods 
and conditions of debate, discussion and persuasion”. 
                                                 
208 A recent example is the advisory referendum about Catalan independence conducted in 2014. While 81% 
voted yes, turnout has been estimated to only 37%.The Economist,10/11-2014. URL: 
https://www.economist.com/blogs/charlemagne/2014/11/catalonias-independence-vote. 




That we must pay attention to the process that goes before and during periods of 
constitutional change is also made by Hutchinson and Colón-Ríos: 
 
Although the proposals of a constituent assembly are normally ratified by the electorate before they 
come into effect, popular participation should not be limited to a process in which experts draft the 
constitutional text and then submit it to a ‘yes’ or ‘no’ vote in a referendum;  it must involve a process 
in which citizens are allowed to propose, debate, and finally decide on the content of their 
constitution.210 
 
To be sure, there is a balance that must be struck between permanence and fluidity. The 
period between constitutional assemblies and the percentage thresholds for petitions, are 
ways of adjusting the balance one way or another. It is also possible to set a minimum 
percentage of participation in the ratifying referendums. This would also be a way to 
reducing worries that citizen’s passivity would enable a highly motivated minority to enact 
changes that does not have majority support. 
 
5.7. Final Words. 
There are certainly dangers in opening up the constitution to greater degrees of change. The 
actual people are not the hypothetical ‘we the people’ we sometimes find in political and 
legal theory. At the end of the day, taking measures to bring the ideal of popular sovereignty 
closer to actuality is an exercise in trust in our fellow citizens. It represents the belief that 
greater degrees of democratic participation, also at the level of basic law, will lead to a 
society that is more sensitive to the needs and desires of its citizens. The discomfort many 
feel about such suggestions is understandable. But I believe that this discomfort ought not to 
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